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Abstract 
The following text engages the concepts of the grotesque, the self, and language through a 
reading of three novels: Severo Sarduy’s Cobra, Samuel Beckett’s The Unnamable and José 
Donoso’s El obsceno pájaro de la noche. The novels introduced here find themselves in the 
position of contributing to the theory of the self, of language and the grotesque through their 
own experimentations with these concepts, and whose method and creativity align with 
particularly critical movements in theory, including but not limited to Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari. Just as theorists such as Mikhail Bakhtin and René Descartes engage with 
problems like ‘what is the self?’, ‘what is language?’ and ‘what is the grotesque?’, so too do 
Beckett, Donoso and Sarduy; and the purpose of this text is broadly to frame these relations 
and contribute an analysis. The novels discussed throughout this thesis show that identity can 
be rethought and redefined. They deterritorialize human identity by evincing different ways 
of behaving and different ways of understanding the self, or even by showing that there is no 
necessity to hold subjects to such a construction. 
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The following text engages the concepts of the grotesque, the self, and language through 
a reading of three novels: Severo Sarduy’s Cobra, Samuel Beckett’s The Unnamable and 
José Donoso’s El obsceno pájaro de la noche. This intersection between these novels and 
the conceptual theories marks a space for the contribution to each of the respective 
discourses. In other words, it maintains the questioning movement inherent to these 
discourses and offers an opportunity to re-think the self, to rethink language, to rethink 
the novel, to rethink Beckett, etc.  
The novels introduced here contribute to the theory of the self, of language and the 
grotesque through their own experimentations with these concepts, and whose method 
and creativity align with particularly critical movements in theory, including but not 
limited to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Each chapter presents the imposition of 
competing discourses of these concepts and not only positions the related novels within 
those discussions, but the novels are also shown to put the limits of these concepts to the 
test. Thus, just as theorists such as Mikhail Bakhtin and René Descartes engage with 
problems like ‘what is the self?’, ‘what is language?’ and ‘what is the grotesque?’, so too 
do Beckett, Donoso and Sarduy; and the purpose of this text is broadly to frame these 
relations and contribute an analysis. 
 
The Grotesque, Language and The Self 
Chapter one engages with the problem ‘what is the grotesque?’ and reviews the 
contributions and differing stances from Mikhail Bakhtin, Wolfgang Kayser, and 
Geoffrey Harpham, among others, which is followed by three characteristics of this 
aesthetic category that were selected for further analysis and implementation: the 
coexistence of contraries, the irresolution of this tension and the deformed body. The 
inclusion of Severo Sarduy’s Cobra and Samuel Beckett ‘s The Unnamable evokes these 
characteristics in an instructive manner.  
 iii 
 
In the first discussion of the grotesque, Severo Sarduy’s Cobra is reviewed for the 
presentation of the grotesque as on the one hand a collection of numerous clashes of 
opposites (violence/eroticism, comedy/tragedy, obscenity/decency) which are left as 
ambivalent elements and, on the other hand a protagonist whose body is restlessly 
morphed. The argument is then made that the body of the main character, Cobra, is 
grotesque because it can be fused with other entities, deformed to bizarre limits and 
removed from its regular functions. Sarduy’s Cobra, therefore, by presenting distortions 
on both social and physical levels, challenges the normalcy and normativity which 
fathom society’s core.  
In the second case, the grotesque is presented in Samuel Beckett’s The Unnamable as the 
deformation of the body of the protagonist along with the ‘deformation of his thoughts’ 
(and his language). This interconnected deformity shows a grotesque entity that loses all 
human shape (physically and intellectually speaking), with a subsequently parallel 
discussion about the Cartesian definition of the human being. Beckett’s grotesqueries in 
The Unnamable conjure the destabilization of our ideas about how we give meaning to 
concepts such as humanity.  
Further, the bringing together of these two novels and the concept of the grotesque leads 
to the discussion that both Cobra’s and the unnamable’s bodies become a Body without 
Organs (BwO), a concept based in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia that 
Deleuze and Guattari published in the 1980’s. This occurs as Cobra is in crisis, 
decentered, chaotic, open, multiple, and excessive, whereas the unnamable has 
reconfigured the organization of his organs placing himself at a limit of existence.  
The second chapter approaches the question ‘what is language?’ and links it with the 
paradox of introducing elements of novelty in a linguistic system. This link is constructed 
by relating the ‘grammatically correct’ to majoritarian discourses which aim to remain 
unchanged and impose their own rules by either ignoring or suppressing expressions that 
fall outside of the law. In this respect, this chapter relies on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
distinction between minor and major literatures, along with other concepts such as line of 
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flight (or line of escape), molecular and molar assemblages, nomad, etc., which are found 
to situate effectively the uses of language in each of the three novels. 
Based on Deleuze’s idea of the unnamable’s stationary voyage from Essay Critical and 
Clinical, it is argued that the unnamable’s situation enables him to make his speech 
nomadic. It is further concluded that, through his presentation of the novel, Beckett 
makes a minoritarian use of language with his writing to the point of ‘dissolving’ it 
(pushing it to a molecular limit), so that it can be shown in its potential at the same time 
that it demonstrates how the construction of significance is an artificial and arbitrary 
process. 
Meanwhile, Sarduy achieves a similar conclusion in Cobra as his uses of language are 
exaggerated and hedonistic (sensual), asking for an experience of bliss (as Barthes 
proposes) from the reader more than a rigid interpretation. Sarduy’s exuberances are also 
evoked in the introduction of several narrative voices and several plots (that are 
inconsistent) as they overlap a variety of meanings for one event, showing that the 
linkage among them is a social construction. The conclusion is that Sarduy spreads 
meanings apart so much that they almost become nonsignifying and for that he resists the 
tyrannical regime of the signifier.  
The section concludes by referring to how Donoso’s El obsceno explores the language of 
some marginalized social groups and by showing that his minoritarian fights disrupt 
major uses of language. Attention is subsequently focused on the chaotic speech and 
behaviour of the old women since they become a line of escape from which major 
discourses in the novel start cracking. 
The third chapter attends to the concept of the self and its limits as a separate problem 
and quality outside of the grotesque. In this respect, Descartes’ categorization of a human 
being as “a thing that thinks” is problematized and considered as a narrow way to 
perceive reality, including space and time, that largely contributes to the construction of 
petrified identities within human beings, and which normalizes their behaviours. 
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The objective of this section is to contrast the Cartesian mono-characterized being to a 
human that explores ways of behaviour and expression outside of the law, called human-
becomings. This idea is supported by The Unnamable’s and El obsceno’s proposal of a 
human that wants to open himself to desire by becoming something-else. The 
protagonists of these two novels, the unnamable and Mudito, share a common tendency 
to continually metamorphose into the other, a tendency that takes them to the limits of 
their humanness. 
These human-becomings are not chained to an identity or a self and, therefore, their 
actions and thoughts indirectly show that social assemblages are vulnerable (no matter 
how stable and strong they appear to be), since they are attempts to systematize the flux 
of life, which cannot be constrained. For these human-becomings, thinking is a 
rhizomatic process that is not replicating the law (of reason) since they develop a type of 
nomadic thought. This section concludes with the consideration that thoughts are not 
‘The’ way to perceive reality.  
Besides the discourses of the philosophers, the aforementioned conceptions and 
problematizations of the self are supported by the analyses of Beckett and Donoso: in 
Beckett’s The Unnamable, the protagonist cannot be defined by a sense of selfness, for 
two reasons: he does not trust his memory, and because of that he cannot be attached to 
an idea of himself. Therefore, he presumably becomes other characters (or nobody at all). 
Meanwhile, Mudito, in El obscene, is a movable element that occupies other characters, 
in the sense that it gives him not a self-identical entity, but a multiple one. Every time he 
occupies a position (either a person or an object), he transforms the configurations of that 
entity as much as his own. Finally, these two characters, the unnamable and Mudito, have 
dissolved their ‘selves’ and, for that reason, they cannot be controlled and be subjected to 







Severo Sarduy’s Cobra (1972) 1 is an effective example of the (neo)baroque, as it 
exaggeratedly exaggerates the mechanisms of language. In the novel characters unfold 
and their identities disappear; the narrative voice does not narrate but rather mumbles and 
detaches from its functions; and the canonic elements of the novel (plot, space-time, 
causes-consequences, opening-climax-closing) are problematized. This text places meta-
fiction on a different level: the book literally ‘talks’ to the readers, it quotes itself and it 
destroys itself.  
For the purpose of introducing the reader to the notable parts of the novel, a short 
summary will follow: The first part, Cobra I, occurs in the “Lyrical Puppet Theater” or 
the “Lyrical Theatre of Dolls” where the protagonist, Cobra, seems to be the main 
performer –for which he is happy, except that he very much dislikes his enormous feet 
(which are inappropriate for his role as a Chinese woman in the Theater). In an attempt to 
shrink them, he and La Señora try different techniques until they finally find a way that 
not only shrinks their feet but also themselves into animal-like dwarfs (their miniature 
doubles). From this point on, the transformations and pilgrimages become constant, going 
from India to the United States of America and passing by Amsterdam, just to mention 
some places. This chapter ends with the death of both doubles and Cobra’s sex-change 
surgery performed by Dr. Ktazob. In Cobra II there is a gang of pseudo-tantric 
motorcyclists who initiate Cobra with hilarious and horrifying rituals that end up with his 
death in very unclear circumstances. After the funeral, which is a mix of sad, comical and 
disgusting situations, the gang members learn Tantric Buddhist rituals from a group of 
                                                 
1
 Severo Sarduy (1937, Cuba – 1993, France) was a novelist, poet, critic, and essayist, and one of the most 
daring and brilliant writers of the 20th century. Disaffected with Castro’s regime and fearful of its 
persecution of homosexuals and the censorship imposed on writers, Sarduy never went home. In Paris he 
came close to the group of critics and theoreticians who published the journal Tel Quel, which promoted 
structuralism and experimental writing. Sarduy wrote the novels: Gestos (1963; “Gestures”), De donde son 
los cantantes (1967; From Cuba with a Song), Cobra (1972; Eng. trans. Cobra), Maitreya (1978; Eng. 
trans. Maitreya), Colibrí (1982; “Hummingbird”), El Cristo de la rue Jacob (1987; Christ on the Rue 
Jacob); the posthumous Pájaros de la playa (1993; “Beach Fowl”); and the essay Barroco (1974; Eng. 
trans. Barroco). This biography, as most of the other biographies presented in this document, was taken 
from the online Encyclopedia Britannica. 
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exiled Tibetan monks who, in turn, learn to deal drugs. The novel ends with the “Indian 
Journal”, which “reflects its historical context in quite a direct fashion [through the] 
Chinese Revolution, the invasion of Tibet (…)” (González Echevarría, 451), in an 
evocation of the mountains and the valleys full of snow.  
With respect to the role of the novel as a text which problematizes the canonic novel 
Sarduy’s Cobra does not have a unified message. Furthermore, the novel – instead of 
wanting to express an ideology – wishes to question concepts such as femininity, 
masculinity, profane, sacred, history, identity, language and meaning, religion, power, 
etc. Cobra is an exploration of the impure, the marginal, the peripheral (the Deleuzian n-
1) and the grotesque offers the possibility of being creative and finding ways to re-think, 
re-define, and re-create conceptions of identity and of the body, as Harpham states: “To 
the artist, the grotesque represents a partial liberation from representationalism, a chance 
to create his own forms […]” (Harpham, 463). 
Cobra’s language is exuberant and uncontrollable: it says, it shouts, and it doesn’t say 
anything. The narrative voice may change suddenly from an omniscient third person to 
the first person: “They saw Cobra. People started to reunite around her. They follow me. 
They molested me. They cornered me against the wall.” 2 These sudden changes create 
confusion in the reader because it complicates knowing who is saying what. In Cobra, 
language is wasted in the sense that it does not intend to inform, resulting in the fact that 
it cannot be consumed and accumulated.  
Furthermore, not only language is being transformed: there is a continuous condition of 
metamorphosis not only in the characters but also in the events and scenarios. Cobra is a 
hybrid and ambiguous being whose motivations to act remain absurd and obscured 
throughout all over the novel. Cobra can be a she inasmuch as a he or an it, i.e., a 
multiplicity of beings, which is a criticism of the way identities are built and how 
arbitrary social roles are.  
                                                 
2
 “Fueron ellos quienes vieron a Cobra. La gente se fue agolpando a su alrededor. Me siguieron. Me 
hostigaron. Me acosaron contra un muro” (Sarduy, 130). All the translations from this novel are my own. 
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It is worth noting that Sarduy wanted to evoke the metamorphosis of a man not only with 
regard to his genitals, but to his whole person. During the narration, the protagonist goes 
for a trip that becomes a multiplicity of spaces, languages, identities, times, etc., where no 
center can be drawn. He is in a constant movement, directing towards other intensities, 
letting his lines of flight be expressed, and achieving a “type of freedom that […] cannot 
be captured.” (Parr, 118)  
Finally, the novel compels wonder about problems such as ‘what is a human?’, ‘what is 
freedom?’, ‘what is normal?’, ‘what are stereotypes?’, ‘what are the roles of a person?’, 
etc. Is Cobra a transvestite because he is a man who wants to be a woman, or because she 
is a woman that people call a man? Is Pup (his midget double) a grotesque figure because 
of her huge puffed-up body, whose shape she cannot control3, or because others made her 
existence monstrous? Throughout the novel Sarduy questions to what extent one should 
let normalization take over conduct. 
Among these questions, Sarduy also compels us to ask “what is knowledge?” Is our 
knowledge an accumulation of names: Brecht, Lacan, Lezama Lima, Descartes, Canova, 
Góngora, Derrida, Calderón de la Barca, Flaubert, Burroughs4, Rembrandt, Cervantes, 
Carreño, Albers, etc.? Or it is possibly an accumulation of quotations? Is the arbitrariness 
of truth based on arguments of authority? ‘What is life?’ Is it a play in a “Lyrical Puppet 
Theater”, or any Theater? Who is the puppet and who is the puppeteer? How is meaning 
constructed? How does one construct beliefs? Another question Sarduy raises is: in order 
to institutionalize truths, who is the best juggler of words? (Or who is the master?) 
Nonetheless, Sarduy imparts the notion that things and phenomena do not mean anything 
per se, but rather that one sees them and then signifies them. Cobra shows that 
                                                 
3
 Poor Pup was “born” among waste and animals, raised as a pet, blown up as a balloon filled with water, 
used as a fake baby to beg for money in the streets, hung like a piece of meat in the slaughterhouse, and 
finally sacrificed to prevent possible pain in Cobra (the character).  
4




transcendence5 can mean meditation for some and an orgasm for others; that desire can 
be a lack for some and productions for others; etc.  
 
Why The Unnamable? 
The Unnamable (1949) is the last novel of the well-known trilogy by Beckett which 
includes Molloy and Malone Dies. It is not sufficient to say that The Unnamable is a 
critique of religion, an argument against fascism, or a meta-critique of the novel as a 
literary genre, because it could be that, not-that or something else entirely. Nonetheless, 
this text takes up the novel’s grotesque characteristics, its engagement with the concept of 
the Self and the manner in which it problematizes language.  
Samuel Beckett6 presents human beings as entities who are alienated and lack identity. 
His characters (particularly, the unnamable) are a mix of tragic, infamous, comic, rare 
and disgusting elements, who live in situations where they have been inserted into 
ridiculous and cruel fictional universes, and whose logic frequently do not match the 
                                                 
5
 Sarduy makes many references to mystical traditions in some Asian and Middle East countries (such as 
the references to Jainism, Islamism, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.), as well as many to Christian religions, in a 
way that parodies rituals and symbolism, again, to show the arbitrariness of our beliefs. His direct allusions 
(to Shrenik, Sidi Abder Rahman, Ganesha, Mahavira, etc.) do not make as much fun of metaphysical 
beliefs as the indirect ones (as when he called Pup the “little crucified” or when he talks about a lunatic 
who is repeating the twenty four names – speaking of the Teaching Gods), but one can observe throughout 
the novel the heavy satiric tone. 
6
 Samuel Beckett (1906, Ireland –1989, France) was an author, critic, and playwright, and winner of the 
Nobel Prize for Literature in 1969. Beckett spent his youth in Ireland and in 1928 he moved to Paris, where 
he met James Joyce. During World War II, he was able to remain there even after the occupation. In 1945 
he returned to Ireland but volunteered for the Irish Red Cross and went back to France as an interpreter in a 
military hospital in Saint-Lô, Normandy. Beckett’s writing reveals his own immense learning. It is full of 
subtle allusions to a multitude of literary sources as well as to a number of philosophical and theological 
writers. The dominating influences on Beckett’s thought were Dante, Descartes, Geulincx and Joyce. 
Beckett’s productions include poems, novels, plays, screenplays, essays and a playlet: More Pricks Than 
Kicks (1934), Murphy (1938), Whoroscope (1930), Echo’s Bones (1935), Dream of Fair to Middling 
Women (published in 1992), Watt (published in 1953), Molloy (1951), Malone meurt (1951; Malone Dies), 
Eleutheria (published in 1951), Waiting for Godot (published in 1951), L’Innommable (1953; The 
Unnamable), Fin de partie (1957; Endgame), Krapp’s Last Tape (1958), Happy Days (1961), Play (first 
performed in 1963), All That Fall (1957), Eh Joe! (1967), Come and Go (1967), Stories and Texts for 
Nothing (1967), Acts Without Words, Rockaby, Not I, Mercier and Camier, etc. 
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reader’s expectations, compelling him to let go of his beliefs. His novels break the logic 
of common and banal sense by presenting scenarios where things do not have a function 
or beings do not have a purpose7: In Waiting for Godot Vladimir and Estragon wait but 
they do not know why or what for; in Not I the protagonist talks even if she does not 
remember what she wants to say and asks for forgiveness despite not knowing why; in 
Malone Dies death is a forever delayed promise; etc. His personae do not believe in 
transcendent forces8, but neither in themselves, making their searches endless since hope 
has ceded to void. Beckett’s books question what it means to be an individual (is he his 
achievements, his belongings, his functions?), what the other is (does otherness even 
exist? how does one relate to others? what is the Self?), what is reality (is it a 
projection/construction of human’s subjectivity? are individuals a part of it?), what is 
memory (can memory be trusted? is it simple fiction?), what is language (can words 
represent reality, thoughts, emotions?), etc.  
Furthermore, Beckett’s texts show the processes behind the construction of truth: In his 
trilogy “the gradual reduction of contents now appears as a progressive process of de-
mythologization” (Esslin, 105). The trilogy evokes characters who little by little start 
becoming a reduced version of a human being (which compels inquiry and wonder into 
what it means to be a person, especially after losing his qualities and when he cannot find 
support in what usually sustains a human being).  
The trilogy begins with a man, Molloy, who is convalescent in his mother’s house and 
who is writing for somebody that comes to pick up the pages and gives him money. 
                                                 
7
 According to some theorists the grotesque is closely related to a play with the absurd. See Kayser, The 
Grotesque, pp. 185 and Harpham, pp. 467.  
8
 Most of the allusions to God are made mockingly or sardonically: “…brought up as she had been to 
believe…with the other waifs…in a merciful…(brief laugh)…God…(good laugh)” (Beckett, Not I) 
Similarly also in the following fragment, where it seems that for the unnamable God is a mere construction: 
“Inexistent. Invented to explain I forget what. Ah yes, all lies. God and man, nature and the light of day, the 
heart’s outpourings and the means of understanding, all invented, basely, by me alone (with the help of no 
one, since there is no one), to put off the hour when I must speak of me.” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 22) Or 
in this following segment, in which Malone exposes God’s magnificence in a sarcastic way: “For my arse 
for example, which can hardly be accused of being the end of anything, if my arse suddenly started to shit 
at the present moment, which God forbid, I firmly believe the lumps would fall out in Australia.” (Beckett, 
Malone Dies, 26) 
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Meanwhile, he narrates everything that he had to go through to get to be with his mother, 
who, ironically, repulses him. In the second part of Molloy, the narrator is Moran, a 
“detective” hired to look for Molloy, and to write about his investigations. The trilogy 
continues with Malone Dies, whose protagonist hopes to die. He can hardly move and all 
he does is tell one story: the one of Sapo (Macmann), who is dying in a room (possibly in 
a hospital?) – which also resembles Malone’s situation. Finally, the series ends with The 
Unnamable which presents a man who does not have a name, who almost does not have a 
body and who states that he does not have thoughts: the protagonist “(…) is but the 
simulacrum of a man with his head held firm in an iron collar. His function is to act as a 
kind of signboard for a restaurant and his vision is limited to the establishment to which 
his frame draws attention. He knows nothing; he fells nothing. He does not know there is 
anything to know” (Esslin, 46).  
In The Unnamable Beckett questions Cartesian logic by presenting a protagonist who 
exists in spite of his doubts about his capacities to think9 and to determine his situation in 
every sense: he does not know where he is, who he is, how he is, or even if he is at all. He 
“carries the Cartesian process backwards, beginning with a bodily je suis and ending with 
a bare cogito” (Esslin, 59). In this novel, the degradation of the physical body seems to be 
attached to the degradation of the mind, since both lack qualities that could define them. 
Furthermore, everything is a haze of doubts10, so there is no place to set oneself (because 
the self should not be fixed?). 
If the novel is anything, it is a flux of words – words that are freed so that they can be 
blasphemy without only being blasphemy, mockery without only being mockery, misery 
without only being misery. In The Unnamable the sentences are long – way too long. It is 
very easy to lose track of the idea… The reader reads pages without finding a spot to rest 
                                                 
9
 Or, in other words, as Sultan argues: “Indeed the Trilogy’s intellectual thrust is post-Cartesian in that it 
reflects the futility of reasoning and thinking.” (Sultan, 423) 
10
 Observe this passage of the novel, where the unnamable says: “where I am, I don’t know, I’ll never 




the thoughts, so the reader starts feeling (and becoming) the madness that the unnamable 
talks about: that unstoppable stream of words that do not let one breathe! Thus, The 
Unnamable is a text whose anti-hero brings anarchy into language. 
Finally, this text considers the fact that Beckett disrupts one’s beliefs, making them into 
grotesque thoughts: “In such a state of doubt the grotesque may offer itself as a reflection 
of the higher truths” (Harpham, 466). Consequently, his personae cannot be more than 
beings without static qualities that question ideas like success, proud, love, truth, etc., 
because to care for them would not make any sense (it would mean to be stationary). And 
yet, is not the unnamable immobile inside a jar? Yes and no. For one he says “I have been 
here, ever since I began to be (…)” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 7), but later on one can 
observe that he actually has been (apparently) in some other places, like somewhere by 
the Pacific11, in his family house,12 or just somewhere else.13  
 
Why El obsceno pájaro de la noche? 
José Donoso’s El obsceno pájaro de la noche (1970) is probably the most acclaimed of 
his novels, since for many of his critics it marks the end of the Boom and a point of 
inflexion for the writer, whose previous prose was known for being realistic and/or 
magical-realistic – González Echevarría finds himself in agreement with this sentiment 
when he says that Donoso’s El obsceno is more daring than his earlier or later fiction.14 
                                                 
11
 See: “My state of decay lends colour to this view, perhaps I had left my leg behind in the Pacific, yes, no 
perhaps about it, I had, somewhere off the coast of Java and its jungles red with rafflesia stinking of 
carrion, no, that’s the Indian ocean (…)”. (Beckett, The Unnamable, 41) 
12
 “Perhaps after all I am simply in the basement”, the unnamable declares. (Beckett, The Unnamable, 42) 
13
 Observe that he says: “I merely doubt that I am in it [the jar].” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 78) 
14
 González Echevarría, Roberto. “Latin American Literature” in the online Encyclopedia Britannica. 
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Donoso15 began writing his novel in 1962, in Chile, and he only finished it in 1969, in 
Barcelona, after having suffered hallucinations caused by an allergic reaction to 
morphine, which was prescribed as part of the treatment to remedy the pain of his ulcer. 
Seemingly, he first planned to write a novel that was going to be called “El último 
Azcoitía,” whose plot recounted the story of an aristocratic Chilean family that had a 
deformed firstborn. In this family chronicle, the protagonist decides to seclude his son on 
one of his properties that also happens to be inhabited by a group of monstrous beings 
which were found and gathered up from all over the country in order to create a space 
where his son’s deformity could become a norm. However, another novel that he was 
also writing simultaneously started intruding on this ordered and clean narration, and the 
characters (street vagrants and decrepit elder women) began intervening in the plot; 
however, it was this second universe that was taking over, with its anarchy of vulgar 
beggars and disobedient old women, without ever really fusing together into a new 
order16. And yet, the disordered fusion which did occur was El obsceno, which became a 
decentered tale in every possible sense: the narrator jumps from one narrative voice to 
another, the characters intermittently take the form of others, and places break into other 
places. El obsceno evokes a hallucinatory and grotesque world and explores the theme of 
the self with profound insights (Mudito’s self is dissolved to the limit of molecular-
existence).  
                                                 
15
 José Donoso (1924 –1996, Chile) was a Chilean novelist and short-story writer who was important in the 
development of the Latin American new novel. He used dark surrealism, black comedy, and social satire to 
explore the lives of decaying aristocrats in a morally disintegrating society. He won the (Chilean) National 
Price of Literature in 1990. Donoso published: Veraneo y otros cuentos (1955; “Summer Vacation and 
Other Stories”), Coronación (1957; Coronation), El charleston (1960; Charleston), Este domingo (1966; 
This Sunday), El lugar sin límites (1966; “The Place Without Limits”; Hell Has No Limits), El obsceno 
pájaro de la noche (1970; The Obscene Bird of Night), Tres novelitas burguesas (1973; Three bourgeois 
novels), Casa de campo (1978; A House in the Country), La misteriosa desaparición de la marquesita de 
Loria (1979; The Mysterious Disappearance of the Little Marquise of Loria), El jardín de al lado (1981; 
The Garden Next Door), Cuatro para Delfina (1982; Four for Delfina), La desesperanza (1986; 
“Hopelessness”; Eng. trans. Curfew), Taratuta: naturaleza muerta con cachimba (1990; Taratuta, and Still 
Life with Pipe), Donde van a morir los elefantes (1995; Where Elephants Go to Die), El mocho (1997; 
posthumous), and Lagartija sin cola (2007 The Lizard’s Tale –posthumous). 
16
 See Ricardo Gutiérrez-Mouat.  
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There are many fascinating topics in El obsceno that nevertheless could pass unperceived 
for those who are not familiar with the Chilean context, such as the widespread tradition 
of incorporating elements of myths and legends related to magic in Latin American 
literature; and the great symbolism of the imbunche17 who is constantly referred in the 
novel and who may be considered as a being whose individuality has been dissolved, 
which supports an argument being forwarded in this text: based on Mudito’s process of 
deindividualization, which is expressed in his constant deterritorializations, it is argued 
that Mudito is in fact a force that occupies different positions, rather than an entity. The 
last chapter of the novel is thus the culmination of this implosion, from which he is 
modified, taking the form of a sewed sack (the imbunche) that is no longer able to 
interrelate with the outside world in spite of his pointless and painful attempts to do so.  
El obsceno is not a realistic novel in the sense that one might expect the fiction to 
resemble reality or for it to make sense in the way that reality does. And yet the novel 
cannot belong to magic-realism simply because it introduces elements of magic. In other 
words, novels of the magic-realism genre are still coherent and clear, whereas Donoso’s 
text presents events that cannot be set as part of a story or a structure. It presents 
contradictions and incompatible plots which make the novel ambiguous and multiple. 
There is a coexistence of different versions of a story, each of which is still meaningful 
and valid and frequently one version interacts with another, breaking the boundaries 
between them, and addressing the conflicting tales in which the event appears. 
Donoso’s novel is more of a puzzle with pieces that overlap than a group of stories that 
bifurcate. His prose remains fundamentally incomprehensible, making clarity, order and 
full comprehension impossible. Things are in perpetual transformation and because of 
this they can never be taken with a sense of completeness. Rather, the occurrences are 
                                                 
17
 In Chilean folklore an imbunche is a hairy monster who protects the entrance to a warlock’s cave. His 
head is supposed to be twisted backwards, as well as his arms, fingers, nose, mouth and ears. One of his 
legs is attached to the back of his neck and consequently he needs to walk on one leg and his two hands. He 
cannot talk and he communicates by guttural, rough and unpleasant sounds. The presence of the imbunche 
announces misfortune.  
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juxtaposed in a way that the novel morphs into a multitude of tales. El obsceno is 
provocative, obscure, perverse and even funny18. 
All of these transformations prevent the stability of the features of the characters, as well 
of their uses of language. Furthermore, it is perpetually unclear who is narrating, not only 
because Mudito occupies several entities without giving the reader a hint, but also 
because other characters intrude on one another. And finally, it is worth noting that the 
places also mutate such that the reader does not know if he is reading about an event in a 
single place narrated by one narrative voice or if he is reading about an event in two (or 
more) places narrated by one or two or more narrative voices. But one thing is certain: 




                                                 
18
 One could read the novel either as a tale of total madness, as if Mudito was a mad person and he had 
constant hallucinations (which probably would not be much of a fun narrative), including the one of seeing 
Peta Ponce in Inés or seeing Inés in Iris; or as an allegory of the nomadic self or collective self; or etcetera. 
Nonetheless, in the second last chapter of the novel there is a scene in which Inés is embodying Iris (having 
chosen the second type of reading) and Mudito shadows her for hours, witnessing her metamorphosis (her 
snotty face mutates to a face with certain nobility) and describing it in a beautiful lyrical language – which 
contrasts with the dry and plain response that he gets from Iris/Inés when he talks to her in the ear. In any 
case, he is not discouraged and he determines to sate himself, now that nobody can come between his 
desire and her (nor Jerónimo neither Peta), but she resists the body that tries to hold her and that scares her 
so much that she cannot hide the terror in her eyes. The black humor in the fragment clarifies: “I force your 
fingers to feel my organ, you grab it, you squeeze it as only a piece of potent meat can be squeezed and 
your sink your nails into it and with a mad jerk you pull it out by its roots, nerves, arteries, veins, testicles, 
tissues, my body being drained of its blood, in torrents that splash you (…), you’ve taken my dangerous 








Chapter 1  
1 Variations of the grotesque in Cobra and The 
Unnamable 
“And when you become-dog, don’t ask if the dog you are playing with 
is a dream or a reality, if it is “your goddam mother” or something else entirely” 
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 
 
Cuban writer Severo Sarduy’s Cobra came out in 1972. This is the third novel that he 
published and it maintains the tenor of experimentation that had already characterized the 
writer. The setting is a transvestite theatre; meanwhile some events take place in India, 
Amsterdam, and China. The novel tells us of the vicissitudes of Cobra, the protagonist, 
during his attempts to shrink his feet and become a woman. Cobra’s plot, nevertheless, is 
the least interesting part of the novel, almost as if it were only a fine excuse sustaining all 
the other elements.  
In Cobra, Sarduy not only subsumes themes on meta-fiction, destroying the barrier 
between the narrator and the interlocutor and quoting the narration into the narration; but 
he also introduces perspectives on religion, exhibiting in a sardonic tone rituals of 
Christianity and Buddhism, ridiculing some of their fanatic practices; on language, 
making syntaxes tremble and semantics not-trustworthy; on logic, postulating paradoxes 
and showing false syllogisms; on the grotesque, showing social distortions, unresolved 
situations, ugly bodies, clashes of opposites (violence/eroticism, comedy/tragedy, 
obscenity/decency); etc. The focus here is on the latter, given that Cobra has a great 
capacity for contrasting the ideal or the normative19, which allows for the occurrence of 
an estranged reality.  
The Unnamable (1949) by Samuel Beckett provides many possible meeting points 
between the two books. When the moment to say something about Beckett’s arrives, 
however, it paradoxically seems that words are insufficient because these discourses are 
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 Bloom, 15. 
 2 
 
excessive. Anything that may be said about his novel would be an imposture, as if any 
attempt to write about it since the very beginning was a betrayal, an abomination, a 
shame. But here I am, trying not only to expose something about The Unnamable but also 
attempting to relate it to the grotesque.  
Beckett’s narration in The Unnamable is schizoid, like Sarduy’s – but in a different way: 
his language is broken and hurt. It is a molecule of an unstable gas that is moving here 
and there, randomly and rapidly; it is a writing that denies and destroys itself, re-creating 
itself in the same progress. Nonetheless, one knows that there is something there. One has 
the intuition to almost understand what is happening, and yet one doesn’t. Reading the 
novel becomes an experience in which thoughts can hardly “condensate” and in which 
one has the sensation of dissolving oneself into the book or into the language. In this 
experience of becoming words, one finds oneself in a transformation that has no return; it 
is irreversible, as much as language itself is in this contradictory suicidal-birth flux. There 
are no objects, there is no time, there are no human beings, there are no substances, there 
are no essences, and there are no centers. There is only language in a deictic function: 
here, language is an object, time, people, substances, essences, center – but only for an 
ephemeral moment before it becomes something else. Much as in Cobra, it turns out to 
be unnecessary to understand what is being said (language is resisting to signify); rather, 
it is important to map the fluxes. Here one can observe an evident attempt to push words 
to a limit, where they can become a nude presentation without teleological claims. 
Beckett says what cannot be said; Beckett names the unnam(e)able. 
In this section, it is argued that there is a close link between the unnamable’s speech and 
the situation of his body, and it furthermore supposes that his speech can somehow 
express his capacity to think. Therefore, when it is mentioned that the unnamable’s 
language is in a suicidal-birth flux, one could argue that his body goes through a similar 
process of disintegration that paradoxically creates new ways to function – maybe that is 
why he insists on the fact that he has not been born yet, since in this pre-birth state there 
still is not a very evident imposition of the law-of-the-other which would restrict one’s 
experimentations. That is, while the unnamable’s body sees a limit of dissolution 
transforming into a grotesque body, his thoughts experience something parallel as well: 
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in the novel he says that he has the shape of an egg and he suggests that he cannot think 
(and that his words are not ‘his’).  
I have chosen Severo Sarduy’s Cobra and Samuel Beckett’s The Unnamable because I 
find several points of intersection between them, such as the uses of language, the 
presentation of grotesque realities and the chronic desire of the writers to separate their 
novels from the canonical elements of the genre. 
 
1.1 The grotesque 
What is the grotesque? How does one define the grotesque: by describing its 
characteristics; by basing it on the type of relations that it builds or on the behaviours that 
it encompasses; or privileging the resistances to its categorization? 
We all have an intuitive knowledge about what the grotesque is, and yet a clear and 
concise definition of it escapes us. If we wanted to decide if a painting is grotesque, most 
of us would probably not hesitate to declare that we see its presence in the art; it is almost 
an emotion, something that comes from very deep inside of us. 
Perhaps because it is not recommendable to leave this to intuition alone, the theorists that 
have studied the notion have managed to agree (different agreements in different epochs) 
in linking certain movements to it20. For instance, for some painters the grotesque would 
mean to brush a blue carnation with voluted branches onto the canvas whose leaves 
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 Harold Bloom eloquently and concisely summarizes the different conceptions of the grotesque: “(…) 
other discussions of the grotesque emphasize its typically incongruous mingling of the fantastic and the 
ideal, the sordid and the real, [and] the comic and the horrificʼ (Barash 562), while still other commentators 
have stressed its focus on suddenness, surprise, and estrangement (Kayser 185) and its often violent 
juxtapositions of laughter and disgust (…). Anthony Di Renzo (…) discusses the grotesque (…) by 
pointing to [the] ʻviolent slapstick’ [the] penchant for distorting the human figure’, the ‘prevalence of 
caricature’ (…), and [the] ‘emphasis on the ugly’ (…). He argues that (…) grotesque art ʻ(…) expresses the 
repressed,’ and that it ‘crosses borders, ignores boundaries, and overspills margins’(…). He finds (…) a 
frequent focus on ʻ(…) the stupid, the obscene, [and] the banal’ as well as a repeated emphasis on 
‘marginal characters’ (…). He [insists] ‘on paradox, on double vision, [and] on the interpenetration of 
opposites’ (…).” (Bloom, 76-77)    
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reminded them of children’s arms, while for others it could mean to paint a man sitting 
on his massive pair of testicles or to sew to the canvas with red thread a corpse of a 
dressed-up rabbit instead of painting it in a scene of Alice in Wonderland.  
It is in this respect that the definition of the grotesque presents difficulties, given that the 
notion has changed continuously since its documented emergence. People that have 
studied the concept emphasize the importance of considering the grotesque as something 
tightly linked to the context of production and the context of reception, so to speak. The 
grotesque, as an aesthetic category, is attached to the values of a certain society: “(…) the 
grotesque depends (…) on our conventions, our prejudices, our common-places, our 
banalities, our mediocrities” (Harpham, 463). 
Nevertheless, there are some qualities that I have found in common among several 
authors: most of them agree to say that the grotesque can be related to a coexistence of 
contraries, to the irresolution of this ambivalence, and to the deformed body. For a work 
of art to be called grotesque, it is especially relevant to observe within it the presence of 
the first two attributes, i.e., the coexistence of contraries (comic and tragic, for instance) 
and the irresolution of the tension associated to the existence of opposites. In other words, 
a literary text that is comic and tragic is not necessarily grotesque (it can very well be a 
tragicomic novel), and one that is ambivalent (a novel about moral ambiguity) is also not 
necessarily grotesque: in this case, it would need to be comic and tragic at the same time, 
keeping the tension in tension. That is to say, the presence of the grotesque in a text 
produces a state of tension that one may not expect to resolve, finding it hard to qualify a 
work as only comic, tragic, monstrous, absurd, fantastic, etc. The important idea is that 
this ambivalence is kept as such, avoiding falling to one side or another, to the absurdity 
or the sensibleness, to the laughter or the crying, to the comic and the tragic, etc. Philip 
Thomson says that one should consider the grotesque “(...) as a fundamentally ambivalent 
thing, as a violent clash of opposites (…)” (Thomson, 11). 
It is crucial to raise the ambiguity (ambivalence). For artists it is not enough to simply 
mix human and non-human beings, or give human attributes to objects. If they stopped 
there, they could easily be creating a fairy tale, like Beauty and the Beast where the pots, 
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the cups and the clocks talk, and the Beast becomes a prince. A grotesque work should 
embrace within it contrary forces; it has to break the harmony; it must disturb. 
However, what does it mean to read within a text an episode that is both macabre and 
delightful at the same time? As one usually does not expect to encounter both of them in 
coexistence, it means that one is going to see it as something not-normal (abnormal, 
subnormal, paranormal). That is to say, it could be normal that one is used to seeing 
something that is delightful (a fluffy, smiley puppy eating a bone) and which in the next 
moment becomes macabre (the bone has flesh that is still bleeding); but one would not 
say the same about something that makes him amused while horrified (a fluffy smiley 
puppy eating his own bone – that is bleeding); that is not normal. As Kayser very well 
indicates, within the grotesque “the natural order of things has been subverted” (Kayser, 
The Grotesque…, 21). Therefore, one commonly comes across a union of two things not 
expected to be entwined.  
There are some issues that attract my attention: on one hand, I mentioned that within the 
grotesque the co-occurrence of contraries is essential. However, what if a subject faces a 
situation where the sequence of events happens so fast that he can hardly appreciate the 
transition from one to another and he actually sees the separate moments as only one? To 
give an example, in Lars von Trier’s Antichrist21 there is a series of scenes (an aggressive 
hit on a man’s genitals, a sexual stimulation of them, a genital that ejaculates as it bleeds) 
that occurs very quickly, making it difficult to decide where an action ends and the other 
begins (what if the series ‘hit–masturbation–ejaculation/bleeding’ should be better 
considered as one single event (hiturbaculading)?), so that one cannot decide if he is 
watching three different scenes or three parts of the same scene. How far apart can the 
clashes of opposites be to one another? One can be sure that the grotesque depends on 
how close these opposite effects (disgust and delight) are achieved, because if the effect 
of one situation comes very delayed from the other one may even forget their connection. 
And yet, how close is close? In the case of written works, one knows that linguistic signs 
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 Antichrist (2009), directed by Lars von Trier, starring Willem Dafoe and Charlotte Gainsbourg, was 
dedicated to Andrei Tarkovsky.  
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are linear (we can only write/read one word at a time), therefore in a strict sense there is 
no simultaneous presentation (the situation is similarly analogous for movies because as 
one can only perceive 12 images per second when he watches 24 or more he starts 
noticing movement – variations of Achilles’ paradox). This is the danger and beauty of 
the grotesque: while elements of it can be found within a work of art, it becomes 
impossible to simply constrain the notion itself to them. What makes one artistic piece 
grotesque may not make another one grotesque. Or, what did not seem grotesque at first 
glance can be seen as such with a second view, as Geoffrey Harpham states:  
“All of this implies that, in approaching a definition of the grotesque, we 
should not always take etymological consistency for conceptual accuracy; 
the definition of this concept, almost as fluid as that of beauty, is good for 
one era –even one man– at a time. When dealing with the grotesque, it 
seems, one must deal either with gross generalizations, arbitrariness, or 
specific statements about specific works.” (Harpham, 461) 
Going back to the coexistence of contraries, when I talk about a “clash of opposites” that 
keeps the ambivalence buzzing, I am referring to an ongoing process, because if the text 
were to incline to one side of this opposition, the ambivalence would be resolved and the 
conflict would vanish. However, the tension, the battling of contraries and the 
irresolution are wished for. The grotesque is like an acrobat walking a tight rope – if she 
falls down the spectacle is over; nevertheless, if the acrobat stays still for too long, the 
spectacle is over as well, since one is going to start caring less and less for her and for the 
possibility of a fall. The grotesque, in an analogous way, has to keep the clash of 
opposites as such, trying to avoid the disappearance of the conflict. 
Let us consider the next example of Beckett’s The Unnamable:  
“When Mahood I once knew a doctor who held that scientifically speaking 
the latest breath [at the moment of dying] could only issue from the 
fundament and this therefore, rather than the mouth, the orifice to which 
the family should present the mirror, before opening the will.” (Beckett, 
The Unnamable, 77) 
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I observe in this brief fragment the narrator making a double movement, because while 
he is talking about a commonly sad and serious topic (death), he is also adding a pinch of 
black humour, which makes one laugh but not without feeling ashamed at the same time. 
I know that I am laughing about the idea of a mirror in a ‘fundament’, but I also know 
that I am not supposed to be laughing, since that ‘fundament’ belongs to a person that just 
passed away. That is the tension: a sadness and an intermittent laughter that one cannot 
help to avoid. If the fragment were only about death, there would not be a conflict, but it 
is grotesque for including both effects (laughter and grief).  
One can take this idea of contrary forces clashing further: in general, the grotesque must 
have the ability to display the normal face of reality while showing an alienated side as 
well, almost like having one eye in the estranged world22 and the other in the ordinary 
world. The spectator/reader should be able to recognize his familiar world so that he can 
also perceive the estranged aspect of it that the work of art is presenting; no matter how 
bizarre the new universe becomes, it is important that it resembles, in one way or another, 
the one that is putting it in risk. Some may perceive this alienated world as something 
fundamentally scary, only for the fact that they are facing a reality whose logic is 
unfamiliar. But that does not necessarily mean that the world is actually scary. I am 
talking here about two different things: the creation of a new realm (that is for that very 
same reason mysterious), and the reaction that one can have in the presence of it. In a 
way it is typical to feel fear of the unknown, as Kayser asserts “The basic feeling (…) is 
one of surprise and horror, an agonizing fear in the presence of a world which breaks 
apart and remains inaccessible” (Kayser, 31), however that emotion is not an exclusive 
response. The unknown could easily make someone feel excitement, anxiety, joy, or even 
anger. Maybe for Kayser’s discourse it was convenient to focus on the fear that an 
estranged reality could engender, but I would prefer to unlink these two things, since I 
believe that one does not necessarily implicate the other. Be that as it may, there is a 
general agreement about the fact that the grotesque is related to its context while “Each 
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 “The grotesque is a structure. Its nature could be summed up in a phrase that has repeatedly suggested 
itself to us: THE GROTESQUE IS THE ESTRANGED WORLD” (Kayser, 184). 
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age redefines the grotesque in terms of what threatens its sense of essential humanity” 
(Harpham, 463).  
But besides that, the grotesque loses its effects of estrangement if it does not have a 
surprising effect– that is, if one can anticipate it… In this respect, it is vital to keep in 
mind the relations with the context. The above quotation from The Unnamable may not 
seem grotesque for a reader which is familiar with that practice, so for him it would be 
normal to put a mirror close to an anus to corroborate that someone has died. This makes 
one asks how to deal with the idea of normality. In one respect, one can be pretty sure by 
now that the grotesque is something that cannot be generalized a priori, without taking 
into consideration the specific work of art, its ways of managing extravagancies, 
bizarreness, the uncanny, fun, etc.; and furthermore its relations to the receiver, his own 
context, his expectations, his fears, etc. The grotesque is something that cannot be settled 
down, it is a line of flight.23 
One more thing to mention: for most of the theorists of the grotesque, it is necessarily 
related to the human body and its functions. For Mikhail Bakhtin the grotesque can 
present alternatives to the normal, the rules, and the restrictions. According to him, the 
grotesque opens paths for creativity, given that the grotesque body is a body in movement 
– it is different and it is strange. It is never finished; it is always to be built, created, re-
created, destroyed... (Bakhtin, 256). In other words, for Bakhtin, in contrast to Kayser, 
the grotesque is a positive force in the sense that it is considered as a creative power. He 
concentrates on the impact of laughter and on abusive language, which altogether with 
the body can build a joyful manner to resist official culture. To give an example: while 
Kayser’s response to the presence of a distorted body could be related to the demonic and 
the misery of life, for Bakhtin that same distorted body would be a way to defeat terror, a 
comic manner to deal with the misery of reality, given that for Bakhtin reality holds a 
multitude of diverse bodies (massive ones, disfigured ones, smelly ones, ludicrous ones, 
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 “A ‘line of flight’ is a path of mutation precipitated through the actualization of connections among 
bodies that were previously only implicit (or ‘virtual’) that releases new powers in the capacities of those 
bodies to act and respond” (Parr, 147). 
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etc.), not only the ones that are “normal”. In other words, for him exaggerated bodies and 
their processes (which normally involve the presence of corporeal fluids) create a comic 
effect than can help reduce the negative side of life. Moreover, within the grotesque the 
focus on the body and its functions (especially in those that are less observed) helps to 
show the cosmic connections of the body with other bodies, instead of considering it as 
only inaccessible matter. For him, life manifests itself through these connections among 
bodies and their unceasing changes, including the transition from death to life and vice 
versa: life comes from death, as much as death comes from life. So the body provides a 
sense of hope given this forever ongoing move of nature: 
“(…) the body and bodily life have here a cosmic and at the same time an 
all-people’s character; this is not the body and its physiology in the 
modern sense of these words, because it is not individualized. The material 
bodily principle is contained not in the biological individual, not in the 
bourgeois ego, but in the people, a people who are continually growing 
and renewed. This is why all that is bodily becomes grandiose, 
exaggerated, immeasurable. This exaggeration has a positive, assertive 
character. The leading themes of these images of bodily life are fertility, 
growth, and a brimming-overabundance. Manifestations of this life refer 
not to the isolated biological individual, not to the private, egotistic 
‘economic man,’ but to the collective ancestral body of all the people.” 
(Bakhtin, 19) 
Again, one should not take Bakhtin’s words as final, or Kayser’s or Harpham’s, for that 
matter. All the characterizations that I have mentioned are attempts to define something 
that may be better to leave a little undefined. There are indeed elements that are common 
in the grotesque, but for no reason one should reduce the concept to them. Nevertheless, 
even if I have concluded that there is no (one) way to define the grotesque, I can however 
indicate that there are forms that are typical or prevalent expressions of it, such as stream-
of-consciousness techniques, the presence of multiple narrators within a text instead of 
one omniscient voice, an incoherent plot or simply lack of a plot, unlinked events, 
chapters that have no relation to other ones, etc. The grotesque aims to present a world 
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that is absurd and that overall does not keep unity and harmony – a fragmented reality 
that is estranged. On a different level, the grotesque usually talks about characters that 
are atypical: predominantly they would be considered ugly (deformed, mutilated, 
disgusting, etc.), even in a metaphorical mode (morally aberrant, with perverse taste, with 
evil and perturbed tendencies, etc.); about situations that are horrifying in a way but that 
are presented in a comic manner, or vice versa; and also about supernatural situations that 
can remind one of the reality, etc. One commonly finds within the grotesque an intricate 
mix of human and nonhuman attributes, an unusual destruction of symmetry (including 
sizes, shapes, etc.), and sinister presences, just to mention the most distinguished ones. 
For a universe with the previously mentioned features to work, it is necessary for a new 
set of laws to govern it, so it is not a surprise to find within grotesque literary texts 
situations that show not only behaviours that one does not expect, but also precepts that 
one could find absurd. In a way, this is why it is not surprising to hear that the grotesque 
is related to the oneiric and fantastic world. Some theorists of the grotesque even mention 
that within the grotesque it seems that order and bonds are left to chance, but I believe 
that the disturbances are there on purpose, as part of the plan. So the grotesque introduces 
chaos, as Harpham states, but chaos does not mean total randomness.  
If there is a global effect of the grotesque, it is that which makes readers (when referring 
to literary texts) feel alienated from their reality. Because of the deformed or twisted view 
that these texts present about reality, it becomes an unsafe and many times unpleasant 
place.  
The grotesque is a way to resist authority’s flat desire; at that, it is an expression of desire 
and a royal way to marginality. As it is always moving, it cannot be governed by any 
external law.24 This is why one may encounter within its mischievous and irreverent 
movements a space for freedom. 
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 It is like what Complex Theory calls an emergent system – it creates its own rules, which only work for 




1.2 Cobra cadabra, Cobra macabre 
Since Severo Sarduy’s novel, Cobra, presents a very wide variety of topics, this paper 
cannot be considered an exhaustive study of it (perhaps this cannot be done at all). It is 
important to point out the presence of two attributes of the grotesque: Firstly, the 
ambiguous/ambivalent, which I will mostly relate to the human body and its 
characteristics, but not restricted to it. My analysis of the grotesque in Cobra can be 
summed up in the different elements mentioned in the quotation: “The grotesque image 
reflects a phenomenon in transformation, an as yet unfinished metamorphosis, of death 
and birth, growth and becoming. (…) The other indispensable trait is ambivalence.” 
(Bakhtin, 24) The other aspect is the strange/deformed body, since I believe that is one of 
the most important qualities of the grotesque. As Harpham says, “One of the most 
frequent ways for an artist to use the grotesque (…) is through the creation of grotesque 
characters. And one of the most obvious ways to effect this alienation is through physical 
deformity.” (Harpham, 465)  
In Sarduy’s novel, the plot is overwhelming, the characters are constantly becoming 
something else and the grotesque is evoked through the excessive use of ornaments, the 
(baroque) uses of language, and the incisive revealing of the arbitrary construction of 
ideologies (sexual, patriotic, religion). He shows us the artifices behind the construction 
of meaning in a violent, very radical, transgressive way that has, nevertheless, elements 
of black humour. 
The idea of the deformed body is regularly expressed in the novel. An example is the 
constant and painful transformations of the body of the protagonist. The idea is simple 
but complicated at the same time: Cobra believes that his feet are too big to be the feet of 
a woman, so he wants to shrink them, but the change breaks the logic of common sense 
when the process results in a duplication of his entire body and, simultaneously, in a 
disfigurement of it.  
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His body overcomes its limits and spreads out: Cobra becomes a double of himself in the 
figure of Pup, in a process that resembles mitosis, while he remains himself (although 
deteriorated). Up to this point one can still talk about Cobra and Pup, but the novel 
reaches a level where it is just as possible to call him he as it is to call him she or they or 
even it. In this sense, Cobra is a Body without Organs (BwO)25, because he/she/it has no 
unity: it is in crisis, decentered, chaotic, open, multiple, excessive.  
Cobra’s body is a deformed body in a literal sense (he gets a vagina) and also in a non-
literal way (he resembles an animal, and he dies several times). In other words, if 
deformed means a loss of ‘form’, then certainly one observes a deformation in Cobra: in 
a literal way, he becomes Pup, he becomes a monk, he becomes a woman, he becomes a 
“rat”. On the other hand, when talking about a deformation in a non-literal way the 
reference is to the distortion of that which is the non-physical part of the human body (for 
instance, its functions). A human body should behave like a human body, not like a 
hybrid body (part animal, part object, part volatile entity); and also a human body should 
be treated like a human body, which is not always the case in the novel, where human 
bodies are treated like things, like depositories or like gods. And in a second instance, 
normally, a human body cannot be reborn, normally, but Cobra dies over and over again, 
immediately reappearing in that fictional world. This displacement of functions can be 
linked to a twist of moral behaviours, as can be observed in the following description:  
On the ground, with one of the Indonesian women, you were rolling, 
intertwined. The priest was penetrating the other woman in front of a god 
with one hundred hands and in each hand one hundred pupils. With the 
smell of their braided greasy hair, the smell of burnt viscera reached you.26  
                                                 
25
 “The Body without Organs (BwO) refers to a substrate that is also identified as the plane of consistency 
(as a non-formed, non-organised, non-stratified or destratified body or term)” (Parr, 37). 
26
 “Por el suelo, con una de las indonesias entrelazado, rodabas. El oficiante penetraba la otra ante un dios 
de cien manos y en ellas cien pupilas desorbitadas. Con el olor de sus cabellos unidos en una trenza, 
untuosos, te llegaba el de las vísceras quemadas” (Sarduy, 225). 
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There is a subtle critique of religious rituals that is very ambiguous, erotic and disgusting. 
This tone of ambiguity can be heard in the text, for instance, in the absurdity of the 
events. Cobra’s original purpose was to become a woman, so would have been satisfied 
with the sex-change surgery. Yet, all that is witnessed here is a sense of loss, a counter-
climactic reaction: “Cobra’s instructor: Now you, Cobra, are like the image that you had 
of yourself. Cobra: How?”27  
Going to the idea of the mutable body, one can perceive a similar process in other 
characters, as in La Señora, in El Maestro and, especially, in Pup. Pup emerges from an 
uncertain part of the body of Cobra, whereupon she is enlarged until she reaches the size 
of Cobra, at which point she becomes Cobra, and then further shrinks and becomes a tiny 
midget again, and finally dies when Cobra becomes a woman.  
Cobra=Pup2 
→ Pup=Cobra 
Another estranged feature of human beings is sexuality. It could be said that Cobra 
divides himself by mitosis, but it is possible to say instead that Cobra gives birth to Pup, 
which means that he distorts the biological function of fertility in human beings and his 
body becomes an extensive (and excessive) body because, in reality, Cobra is giving birth 
to himself, creating an entity that is actually a multiplicity of entities, something 
uncategorized and contradictory: a travesty is two (man/woman); a travesty that gives 
birth to another travesty (because he is he but he is also she) is four or eight (an entity 
that is two times duplicated):  
Cobra=Pup2 
and  Cobra=woman man 
→ Cobra=(woman+man)2=woman22womanman+man2=Pup2 
                                                 
27
 “Instructor de Cobra –Ya eres, Cobra, como la imagen que tenías de ti. Cobra –¿Cómo?” (Sarduy, 118). 
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That is to say, a body, which is an excess of bodies and an excess of sexualities (a 
molecular sexuality28), emerges, which is, according to Harold Bloom, one of the 
characteristics of the grotesque: “The grotesque involves primarily an excessive or 
distorted experience of the body.” (Bloom, 97) In summary, a character that is herself and 
at the same time is someone else and/or nobody; this can only mean that their her/their 
existence is not subject to a priori definitions that determine its development, but rather it 
is free to be what-is-already-being; the mechanism is contrary to the Cartesian logic:29 I 
am, therefore I (may) think.  
Cobra displays many abnormal universes whose principles can– to a certain degree – be 
related to his reality, but only to a certain extent because, at the same time, the logic 
behind those principles is distorted and unfamiliar. For instance, in the following 
paragraph there is an uncomfortable mix of beauty and cruelty, given that Sarduy 
presents an unpleasant event in a poetic manner, using idealistic clichés, such as throwing 
somebody’s ashes to the wind in a romantic gesture: 
They cut his skin into ribbons which they nailed to the rocks. They 
crushed the bones. They mixed that powder with barley flour. They 
dispersed it into the wind. They repeated the syllables for the last time. 
They abandoned everything. For the birds.30  
                                                 
28
 “(…) everywhere a microscopic transsexuality, resulting in the woman containing as many men as the 
man, and the man as many women, all capable of entering –men with women, women with men– into 
relations of production of desire that overturn the statistical order of the sexes. Making love is not just 
becoming as one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand” (AO, 295-296). 
29
 I believe that, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari are proposing a type of thought that one 
can call “nomadic thought”. This would be a type of thinking that is not interested in reproducing any 
model (which would imply to fix a point of view). They are rather attracted to a thinking process that is 
movable, and that does not have an image to imitate: “One is obliged to follow when one is in search of the 
‘singularities’ of a matter, or rather of a material, and not out to discover a form; when one escapes the 
force of gravity to enter a field of celerity; when one ceases to contemplate the course of a laminar flow in a 
determinate direction, to be carried away by a vortical flow; when one engages in a continuous variation of 
variables, instead of extracting constants from them, etc.” (ATP, 372). 
30
 “Le cortaron la piel en bandas que clavaron a las piedras. Le machacaron los huesos. Mezclaron ese 
polvo con harina de cebada. Lo dispersaron al viento. Repitieron por última vez las sílabas. Lo 
abandonaron todo. Para los pájaros” (Sarduy, 197). 
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This quotation evokes a sense that “(…) the natural order of things has been subverted.” 
(Kayser, The Grotesque…, 21) In this case, subverted means destabilized and challenged, 
so that it becomes impossible to foresee future events, which is one of the consequences 
of a destabilized system. And what is this implication? That there is no expected 
connection between two events and that the world stops being representation and starts 
being presentation: reality is whatever is presented right there, in other words it is 
immanence.  
Here there is a paradox: if the grotesque is presentation, then it cannot be a distortion, 
given that a distortion derives from another that is not itself. Or, is it that this derivation 
should not be considered as iteration, and it should instead be seen as a point of contact, 
as a cathexis? If the grotesque is not a distortion, could it rather be rather the presence of 
the abnormal? In this sense, the grotesque would be a view of the less-viewed side, or 
sides, of reality, whatever is not the norm, the rule, the general; the grotesque would be a 
defense of the exception and Cobra would be the epitome of it. As mentioned before, 
Sarduy exhibits the myths behind binary constructions and classifications of reality. He 
does so by overlaying elements that one normally would not find together, creating new 
metonymical relations and making the old ones shake, as Thomson states: “This effect of 
the grotesque can best summed up as alienation. Something which is familiar and trusted 
is suddenly made strange and disturbing. Much of this has to do with the fundamental 
conflict-character of the grotesque, with the mixture of incompatible characteristics of it.” 
(Thomson, 59) He, like many writers of the grotesque, keeps the emphasis on the body 
(as a lower stratum) and its impure and dirty secretions. 
To summarize, Cobra is a grotesque character for several reasons: 1) the most obvious 
example is the female/male hybrid body, the ambivalent being; 2) this body happens to 
be able to reincarnate31, death being, however, a way to degrade the body, that is, a way 
to fuse with the lower stratum of the body; 3) because of his/her attempts to become other 
                                                 
31
 For instance, Tigre talks to Cobra at his funeral as if he were alive: “Eat whatever you want from what 
we have given you. But realize that you are dead and do not come to this house anymore”. “Come lo que 
quieras (…) de lo que te hemos dado. Pero date cuenta de que estás muerto y no vengas más a esta casa.… 
(Sarduy, 194). On reincarnation, see also pp. 207, 245 and 252. 
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(he/she is in constant metamorphosis - deformation); 4) he/she has exaggerated 
characteristics (his/her feet32); 5) he/she is his/her own double33 (ambiguous); and 6) also 
because his/her body is the space where a superposition of hilarious stereotypes develop. 
In Cobra I, he is always called a she even if he, biologically speaking, is still a man. In 
Cobra II, after Dr. Ktazob gives him the aspired “little gash”, a woman (presumable La 
Señora) that sees her behind a vitrine in Rembrandtsplein, exhibiting herself, says: “it is 
him”34.  
With regards to the theme of the double, it is important to recall that it refers to the 
ambiguity in the grotesque, since it can introduce confusion, absurdity, disorder, loss of 
perspective, social ruin, anxiety, etc., into the text, turning the world into an unsafe place 
whose rules are difficult to figure out. Cobra is a grotesque body because it is always 
becoming something, because the processes are hyperbolic and outlandish, and also 
because he sustains a very disturbing relationship with Pup (the double). One should 
always keep in mind that Pup emerged from a part of the body of Cobra, but the text also 
suggests that the double is Cobra himself in a reduced version – almost as if Pup were a 
version of him linked together by invisible strings, whose consequences, nevertheless, 
can be observed: when Eustaquio paints Cobra’s body. He paints the same things on 
Pup’s body; when Cobra has left for India, Pup occupies his place in the Theatre; when 
                                                 
32
 It is really never clear if Cobra was able to shrink the feet or not. At the end of “Lyrical Puppet Theater 
II” one can read that the bones in his feet broke and that some flowers blossomed there, nothing else (Ref. 
Sarduy, 37). However, even if, at the beginning of “White Dwarf”, one sees that they finally found the 
shrinking juice, one can also read that all of Cobra’s efforts were for nothing (conf. Sarduy, 41-42). 
Furthermore, in “I Dedicate This Mambo to God” there is a brief description of Cobra: “In the right breast a 
ruby was hiding. He had big feet and had humped high heel. He was singing a mambo in Esperanto”, that 
shows that either he never had small feet or that they grew again. “En el seno derecho se ocultaba un rubí. 
Tenía grandes los pies y un tacón jorobado. Cantaba un mambo en esperanto” (Sarduy, 93). 
33
 Let us consider Bakhtin’s argument: “(…) the life of one body is born from the death of the preceding, 
older one.” (Bakhtin, 318) In which he suggests that the grotesque body is part of a duplicity. He also 
states: “(…) grotesque imagery constructs what we might call a double body” (Bakhtin, 318). 
34
 At the end of “How are you?” an eighty-year old woman recognized him in spite of his surgery and his 
custom: “Es él” (Sarduy, 130), she says.  
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Dr. Ktazob is changing Cobra’s sex, Pup feels all the pain. Pup is Cobra, but a malevolent 
and ugly version of him. Pup and Cobra together are a multiplicity35.  
Cobra’s sex-change surgery is one of the most perturbing episodes of the novel: Cobra 
looses his penis and his double (in a manner that resembles voodoo) in the same 
mo(ve)ment. Prior to starting the procedure, Dr. Ktazob explains to Cobra that he does 
not use anaesthesia because it is very important for the patient to stay alert the whole 
time, so that when the change is done there is no risk of feeling disconnected from the 
restructured body. Consequently, they need another body (Pup’s) to which to redirect the 
pain, so that the body that is going through the surgery (Cobra’s) can handle the 
operation. The plan for the transference of pain goes outside: 
An instructor I will train the subject S, so that S can learn to emit the 
caustic darts; another instructor will train the scapegoat so that he will not 
resist. In this way, the alterer A will be able to use his modeling force over 
the Subject in order to transform him into Subject derivative, a force 
whose hurting vector will suffer, in this case, the little altered that is there 
(a), transformed for the therapy that has taught a lesson, into the optimal 
(a) derivative (…) All of this is representable by the graph of mutation: 
Diamond. 36  
                                                 
35
 “A multiplicity is (…) a complex structure that does not reference a prior unity. Multiplicities are not 
parts of a greater whole that have been fragmented, and they cannot be considered manifold expressions of 
a single concept or transcendent unity. On these grounds, Deleuze opposes the dyad One/Many, in all of its 
forms, with multiplicity. Further, he insists that the crucial point is to consider multiplicity in its substantive 
form – a multiplicity – rather than as an adjective – as multiplicity of something. Everything for Deleuze is 
a multiplicity in this fashion.” (Parr, 181). For Deleuze it is important to consider all the relations (the 
virtual, the intensive and the actual) that correspond to qualities and singularities, as De Landa states: “(…) 
multiplicities consist of a structure defined by differential relations and by the singularities which 
characterize its unfolding levels” (De Landa, 50). 
36
 “Un Instructor I ejercitará al sujeto S para que aprenda a emitir dardos cáusticos; otro al chivo emisario 
para que no ofrezca resistencia. Así el alterador A podrá ejercer su fuerza modeladora sobre el Sujeto para 
convertirlo en Sujeto prima, fuerza cuyo vector lancinante padecerá, en este caso, la alteradita que está allá 
afuera (a), transformada por la terapia aleccionante, en receptora óptima (a) prima…. Todo es representable 




The descriptions of the surgery are very bloody and fresh, subtle but direct; and they 
show a body that is vulnerable, beautiful in its fragility. It seems that Dr. Ktazob and the 
instructors (who look like executioners – one of whom is La Señora) are enjoying giving 
pain to both bodies, and they also advise Cobra to be pitiless, i.e. not to feel badly for 
having to sacrifice Pup37. After the surgery, it is also very disturbing to realize that Cobra 
has not only received female sexual organs, but also that she has become a cobra (Naja 
naja): She curls. She hisses. Her tongue breaks. Her fangs suppurate. (Ref. Sarduy, 118-
121.)  
Through the surgery Cobra is transferring to Pup all the negative elements (the maleness) 
that greatly repulsed her about her body: in a way, the surgery is taking away all her 
grotesqueries. And, at the same time, it is promising her the perfect image of a female. 
Nevertheless, even if it appears that the surgery effectively transferred the misfortunes to 
Pup, it did not succeed in transforming Cobra into a convincing woman. The other 
characters react in an unpleasant way when encountering this mix of female and male 
attributes, that is scared and mute, as can be seen when she is in the subway and people 
make fun of her: ‘the beggars laugh at her’38 and ‘A filthy beggar, rags skewered with 
trinkets, gets close to her from behind, walking on her tip toes, a scream, she cuts Cobra’s 
                                                 
37
 “Equally destructive are the exercise of good and bad. You have eliminated compassion from you. With 
all your strength, now direct the pain to the midget: she is diabolic, underprivileged and ugly, who cares 
about what can happen to her? She is not more than your waste, your vulgar residue (…).”  “Igualmente 
destructores son el ejercicio del bien y del mal. Has eliminado en ti la piedad. Con todas tus fuerzas dirige 
ahora el dolor hacia la enana: ella es diabólica, menesterosa y fea, ¿qué más da lo que pueda sucederle? No 
es más que tu desperdicio, tu residuo grosero….” (Sarduy, 115). 
38
 “(…) se ríen de ella los mendigos…” (Sarduy, 126) 
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cape. They pull off her hat. The loud laughs resound in the vault’39. Since the beginning 
in the “Lyrical Puppet Theater”, she has been a spectacle; a transgressor: she/he 
contravenes the boundaries between male and female, and for that she has gone beyond 
the poor duality. Furthermore, the hybrid becomes even broader by extending the human 
body to an animal body:  
She wears her make-up violently, the lipstick on her mouth like tree 
branches. The orbits are black and aluminum silver, thin between the 
eyebrows and then extended through other volutes, make-up and metal 
dust, to the temples, to the base of the nose, in wide ornamental borders 
and arabesques as those of swam eyes, but with richer and in finer colors; 
on the edges no eyebrows are hanging but lines of tiny precious stones. 
From the feet to her neck she is a woman; above, her body transformed 
into a type of heraldic animal with a baroque snout.40 
All the violence that Cobra’s body suffers (cuts, duplications, immolations, 
anthropophagy, reincarnations) shows that it cannot be destroyed. His body is a grotesque 
body because it can be a canvas, a corpse, a piece of skin, a sexual object, and even a 
chair: 
With a chair and his/her clothes he started to build the image of the dead 
person [Cobra]. On the front legs of the chair he put on pants and boots; he 
dressed the back of the chair with a red sweater, and put an old and dirty 
antelope leather jacket: on the chest of the leather jacket you could still 
make out an open vertical arc, dripping, all wet in the felt, twisted like a 
                                                 
39
 “Una pordiosera mugrienta, harapos ensartados de baratijas, se acerca por detrás, en puntillas, un grito, 
le raja la capa. Le arrancan el sombrero. Las carcajadas retumban en la bóveda (…)” (Sarduy, 127). 
40
 “Está maquillada con violencia, la boca de ramajes pintada. Las órbitas son negras y plateadas de 
alúmina, estrechas entre las cejas y luego prolongadas por otras volutas, pintura y metal pulverizados, hasta 
las sienes, hasta la base de la nariz, en anchas orlas y arabescos como de ojos de cisne, pero de colores más 
ricos y matizados; del borde penden no cejas sino franjas de ínfimas piedras preciosas. Desde los pies hasta 




cut serpent; then, as in the past, traced with a single gesture by a 
calligraphist in an angular style, the divination circle, twisted over itself 
and without borders, a perfect ring; imprinted by a stone stamp close to a 
circle with a square stamp: BR, lacerated close to the shoulder, an A.41 
Cobra: the animal, the man, the woman, the dwarf, the resurrected, the thing: the 
grotesque.  
 
1.3 The Unnamable: the human as a grotesque entity 
As mentioned before, the grotesque can be found in many different ways, and it will 
always depend on the reader (in the case of literary texts) to decide (to feel) if the work of 
art can belong to this aesthetic category or not. In Beckett’s The Unnamable the 
grotesqueries are related to the deformation of the physical body of the protagonist and, 
so to speak, also to the deformation of his mind. All of that leads to the question of what 
it means to have an identity and to be (a free) human.  
The distortion of a human being in The Unnamable can be recognized on two levels: first, 
in the body, which for the grotesque is typically ruined, deformed or reduced, and second, 
in the spirit or intellect, where it shows perversity, cruelty, evil or madness. In The 
Unnamable it is very clear that both levels of deformation are entwined since the body of 
the protagonist is losing as much shape as his speech, which may be a projection of his 
thoughts. Throughout the novel, the unnamable’s42 body is losing its shape: he resembles 
an egg; apparently he does not have any protuberances in his body (hands, legs, nose, 
                                                 
41
 “Con una silla y su ropa empezó a armar la imagen del muerto. Le puso pantalones a las patas delanteras 
y un par de botas, vistió el espaldar con un suéter rojo, le abrochó un jacket de antílope, raído y sucio: en el 
dorso aún podía adivinarse un arco vertical abierto en la piel, chorreado, embebido en la felpa, retorcido 
como una serpiente macheteada; luego, como antaño, trazado de un solo gesto por un calígrafo de estilo 
anguloso, el círculo de la adivinación, torcido sobre sí mismo y sin bordes el aro perfecto; estampado por 
un cuño de piedra, junto a un círculo un sello cuadrado: BR, lacerada junto al hombro una A” (Sarduy, 
193). 
42
 When I refer to ‘the unnamable’ spelled this way I am talking about the character in the novel. 
 21 
 
penis, ears, etc.); he has lost his eyelids; and his brain is also deteriorating: “The tears 
stream down my cheeks from my unblinking eyes. (…) Perhaps it is liquefied brain.” 
(Beckett, The Unnamable, 6) Later, he also starts doubting his capabilities to think43 and 
his competency to speak, and, furthermore, he becomes skeptical about every statement 
which he utters, including the veracity of his arguments. Very often, he makes the reader 
suspect that he is a madman, maybe even in a madhouse.  
It seems that both his body and his mind are placed within the limit of their dissolution, 
on a threshold that is the circumstance for their disappearance and, simultaneously, for 
their liberation, as if the unnamable were a Body without Organs (BwO)44, placed on the 
edge of the molar machines (which would demand his disappearance, since becoming 
part of them implies submitting to social assemblages) and molecular machines (which 
would free him, bringing him close to a schizo-existence, where desires can be 
unleashed).45 This coincides with the description that the unnamable makes about 
himself:  
“Perhaps that’s what I am: the thing that divides the world in two – on the 
one side the outside, on the other the inside. (That can be as thin as foil.) 
I’m neither one side nor the other, I’m in the middle. I’m the partition. I’ve 
two surfaces and no thickness. Perhaps that’s what I feel: myself vibrating. 
I’m the tympanum.” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 134)  
He is a membrane that is part of both worlds (body/external and mind/internal) without 
needing to be one more than the other, or without being able to be one more than the 
                                                 
43
 “(…) all Beckett’s work paradoxically insists upon and rebels against the Cartesian definition of man as 
‘a thing that thinks’” (Esslin, 170). For Cartesians the construction of the self depends on the human 
capacity to think. Beckett is skeptical about this skill, and I would add that he would not suggest that this 
characteristic constitutes the essence of humankind.  
44
 “(…) the body without organs [is] a pivot, (…) a frontier between the molar and the molecular” (AO, 
281). 
45
 In Anti Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between two possible destinies of the cathexis: molar 
and molecular. According to my understanding, the molar is related to the social structures and to the laws 
of the subjugated group, whereas the molecular has to do with the fluxes of life and the production of 
desire. See also the diagram on p. 282. 
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other. That is how the dichotomy mind/body is overcome in Beckett’s The Unnamable, 
because it shows how the exclusion of one from another is a false separation: one cannot 
exist without the other and whatever affects one also affects the other, in both ways; that 
is to say, he shows the inaccuracy behind the dichotomy thoughts/existence by presenting 
a being whose existence is not only a consequence of his thoughts but whose thoughts 
cannot be detached from the material experience of his body.  
In other words, body and mind are part of one human machine and their functions and 
perceptions are closely and necessarily related. Deleuze argues that matter can be 
productive without human intervention, and also that the world does not urge human’s 
explanations to make sense by itself. But if Deleuze only had stayed there, explains De 
Landa, he would just have been flipping Cartesian cogito, and it would have been just as 
insufficient for explaining reality.46 Deleuze clarifies that matter and human production 
(including interpretation) are in a constant mutual intervention, and that the connections 
that are involved in the construction of reality are countless. 
However, Beckett does not let one keep going. Once again, he throws another set of 
doubts over this partial conclusion: how can thoughts and senses be trusted? Are the 
explanations formulated about the relation between the material world and the 
metaphysical world accurate and correct? How does one differentiate between a 
simulacrum and a presentation? To what extent are thoughts overlapping on actual 
reality47, thereby impeding him to see it? 
                                                 
46
 “The Cartesian method (the search for the clear and distinct) is a method for solving supposedly given 
problems, not a method of invention appropriate to the constitution of problems or the understanding of 
questions” (De Landa, 231). As I see it, Deleuze and Guattari are trying to understand reality not by 
imposing a method, but by seeing what matter and its singularities (intensive and extensive) are showing 
through the relations that it produces. Their ideas imply that in the material world there is a connectivity 
full of complex relations and that events are continuously changing (and, for that reason, it is not possible 
to talk about essences).  
47
 Consider that, as I just mentioned, actual reality is an incessant co-construction between beings and 
objects; not a fixed picture that is out there waiting to be seen/discovered. I call it actual reality in 
opposition to simulated reality, which is the result of imposing ideas and ideologies on different social 
assemblages over what-is-being-there, trying to block the movement and the emergence of novel ways to 
relate elements. See this fragment, where the unnamable questions the trustworthiness of social values: 
“They gave me courses on love, on intelligence, most precious, most precious. They also taught me to 
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To attempt to solve these questions, it is useful to return to the role of the body and its 
grotesqueries. One of the most common themes of the grotesque is that of the body, 
making special reference to those characteristics of the body related to the secretion of 
substances, to the presentation of the body in its exuberances, to its death/life cycle, and 
to its deformed cases, as Thomson says: “(…) the grotesque is essentially physical, 
referring always to the body and bodily excesses (…)” (Thomson, 56). Most of the 
writers of the grotesque allude to bodies that are not examples of the classic ideals of the 
perfect body, preferring to show individuals with huge, distorted, dirty, disabled, 
mutilated, or wretched bodies; and emphasizing those malfunctions of it that normally are 
hidden from canonic literature and/or actual life. And even if Bakhtin argues that the 
grotesque body commonly focuses on its protuberances48, he also suggests that it is 
enough to present a body that is far from normal (whether a gigantic or a mutilated 
figure49 one). In this respect, Thomson emphasizes the presence of diseased and 
deformed50 bodies in most of the literary texts of the grotesque. The protagonist of The 
Unnamable has a distorted body that has totally lost the shape of a human body51, having 
lost most of the organs that would give him access to all his senses:  
“Why should I have a sex, who have no longer a nose? All those things 
have fallen, all the things that stick out, with my eyes, my hair, without 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
count, and even to reason. Some of this rubbish has come in handy on occasions, I don’t deny it, on 
occasions which would never have arisen if they had left me in peace. I use it still, to scratch my arse with. 
Low types they must have been, their pockets full of poison and antidote. (…) There were four or five of 
them at me, they called that presenting their report” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 13). 
48
 “Of all the features of the human face, the nose and mouth play the most important part in the grotesque 
image of the body (…). It is looking for that which protrudes from the body, all that seeks to go out beyond 
the body’s confines” (Bakhtin, 316). 
49
 “Grotesque images (…) present (…) members, organs and parts of the body (especially dismembered 
parts) (…)” (Bakhtin, 318). 
50
 See Thomson, 8. 
51
 “I would gladly give myself the shape, if not the consistency, of an egg, with two holes no matter where 




leaving a trace, fallen so far so deep that I heard nothing, perhaps are falling 
still, my hair slowly like soot still, of the fall of my ears heard nothing.” 
(Beckett, The Unnamable, 23) 
He also states that he no longer has legs or arms. The funny thing about him is that 
somehow he has managed to keep breathing, talking, seeing, hearing and having 
erections: 
“I who murmured, each time I breathed in, Here comes more oxygen, and 
each time I breathed out, There go the impurities, the blood is bright red 
again. The blue face! The obscene protrusion of the tongue! The 
tumefaction of the penis! The penis! Well now, that’s a nice surprise, I’d 
forgotten I had one. What a pity I have no arms, there might still be 
something to be wrung from it. No, ‘tis better thus. At my age, to start 
manstuprating again, it would be indecent. And fruitless. And yet one can 
never tell. With a yo heave ho, concentrating with all my might on a horse’s 
rump, at the moment when the tail rises: who knows, I might not go 
altogether empty-handed away. Heaven, I almost felt a flutter! Does that 
mean they did not geld me? I could have sworn they had gelt me. But 
perhaps I am getting mixed up with other scrota.” (Beckett, The 
Unnamable, 62–63)  
This apparent contradiction is reminiscent of what Deleuze and Guattari say about 
the Body without Organs (BwO), namely that it does not want to get rid of its 
organs, but rather it wants to fight organisms52 (that are only a strata of the body), 
i.e. the BwO does not want to destroy its organs (it needs them to function), but it 
wants to open them to new behaviours and connections. Therefore, when the 
                                                 
52
 “We come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are 
not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization 
of the organs called the organism.” (ATP, 158) and “Dismantling the organism has never meant killing 
yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, 
conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and 
deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor” (ATP, 160). 
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unnamable states that he does not have eyes, he probably does not literally mean 
that he does not have eyes, but that he has learned to make them function in 
another way. What type of human is this human? Just another life-form. The 
unnamable has achieved becoming a human without identity and goals (useless 
purposes) and, as a consequence, he prevents external attempts to constrain him. 
He needed to dissolve his self, to transform it into various selves, a multitude of 
selves (Mahood, Murphy, Malone, Molloy, Moran, Mercier, etc.), in order to be 
able to build a type of power that no fascist machine could remove and, as a result, 
be free to experience this molecular joy that has no boundaries. But all of this is 
subject to one condition: to continue becoming something else, not to be 
permanent, to move. The unnamable (quasi human, subhuman, prohuman, 
hyperhuman?) exemplifies a grotesque figure for the reason that he lacks most of 
the characteristics that are typically associated with humanness, without stopping 
being human, by placing himself within a limit. 
In grotesque literature, the deformed body is not always an extremely 
dismembered body as in the case of the unnamable. Grotesque literature can also 
refer, as previously mentioned, about the deformed body (as in The Hunchback of 
Notre Dame), about the disabled body (as in Moby-dick) or about the monstrous 
body (as in the Obscene Bird of the Night). And even if this theme can very easily 
hurt some sensibilities, it is important to recall that, for the grotesque, the point of 
bringing up these bodies is not to mock the possible repulsiveness or ugliness, but 
rather almost precisely the opposite, to question who decides the standards of 
beauty and normality, and what the purposes behind these separations and useless 
dichotomies are (for instance, functional/dysfunctional – would it be more accurate 
to talk about necessary and sufficient functions of the body?). A monster is 
perfectly functional, but repulsive (or fascinating, depending on the norm53); while 
if one talks about a disabled body, as in the captain of Moby-dick, in a strict sense 
one should not be talking about disability given that Ahab managed to travel the 
                                                 
53
 In The Obscene, monstrosity is the rule and a higher level of monstrosity provides more benefits. 
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seas and command a large crew. This leaves the third case: the deformed body that 
seems to lie between the other two categories, because it is not so ugly, but rare 
enough, and because it is almost perfectly functional, but not totally efficient. 
Nevertheless, all of these divisions sound foolish and perhaps Beckett was trying to 
show their idiocy by presenting a human whose body is totally dismembered and 
who, nevertheless, can perform the necessary and sufficient functions of the body: 
to eat54, to expulse human residues55, to think, etc. 
Beckett’s The Unnamable questions these truths and many others. When reading the 
novel, one must also enter into an ‘inquiring mood’ (see Bakhtin, 27) and believe that 
whatever the unnamable says might be a joke. In other words, he warns the reader from 
the very beginning of the book: “(…) what should I do, in my situation, how proceed? By 
aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered, or 
sooner or later? (…) I should mention before going any further, any further on, that I say 
aporia without knowing what it means.” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 3-4) The narrator 
keeps doing so over and over throughout the text, because, as Robbe-Grillet remarks, he 
first states that he looks like an egg with the consistency of mucilage, “But this shape and 
consistency are themselves immediately contradicted by an absurd detail: the speaker 
supposes himself to be wearing puttees – singularly unlikely attire for an egg” (Esslin, 
108). Let us add more contradictions to our list: he does not have a nose, but he smells 
the stable (does one need a nose to smell smells?); he has always been in the jar, but he 
went to his family’s house56; he sees Malone, Madeleine, Mahood, but he has always 
been alone57. Is he perhaps imagining?  
                                                 
54
 “Did I say I catch flies? I snap them up, clack! Does this mean I still have my teeth? To have lost one’s 
limbs and preserved one’s dentition, what a mockery!” (The Unnamable, 62). 
55
 “For the woman, displeased at seeing me sink lower and lower, has raised me up by filling the bottom of 
my jar with sawdust which she changes every week, when she makes my toilet” (id., 61). 
56
 “Finally I found myself, without surprise, within the building, circular in form as already stated, its 
ground-floor consisting of a single room flush with the arena, and there completed my rounds, stamping 
under foot the unrecognizable remains of my family, here a face, there a stomach, as the case might be, and 
sinking into them with the ends of my crutches, both coming and going. To say I did so with satisfaction 
would be stretching the truth. For my feeling was rather one of annoyance at having to flounder in such 
muck just at the moment when my closing contortions called for a firm and level surface. I like to fancy, 
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Is he inventing the fact that he hears other voices? What if the voices that he hears are not 
other people’s voices, but his own voice coming from an unfolded self? Is he schizoid58? 
One should not forget another important element of grotesque literature: according to 
Bakhtin “the theme of madness is inherent to all grotesque forms, because madness 
makes men look at the world with different eyes, not dimmed by ‘normal,’ that is, by 
common place ideas and judgments” (Bakhtin, 38-9). 
If the unnamable is a madman, how can craziness be read from the outside? How can one 
pretend to have interiorized something that is only seen from far away? (Distance is 
censorship.) How can one become the unnamable’s words in the same way that he 
became ‘his’ words?  
The Unnamable shows the paradox of calling somebody crazy: he who calls you crazy 
only does so because you are not (like) him. Craziness is a misinterpretation of otherness 
or a resistance to really seeing the other, instead of wanting to project ourselves in the 
other (as in a mirror). Beckett’s text suggests that it does not matter on which side of this 
equation you are standing (on the side that calls the mad or the non-mad – mad, or on the 
side that has been called mad), either way you are unavoidably a part of it, as he states 
“Sometimes I say to myself, they say to me, Worm says to me, the subject matters little, 
that my purveyors are more than one, four or five. But it’s more likely the same foul 
brute all the time, amusing himself pretending to be a many (…)” (Beckett, The 
Unnamable, 89) He also insinuates that there is a way to reduce this distance and to stop 
being the analyst who puts tags on the other. To begin with, let me ask what does it mean 
‘to really see the other’? In order to (really) see the others one has to distance oneself 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
even if it is not true, that it was in mother’s entrails I spent the last days of my long voyage, and set out on 
the next. No, I have no preference, Isolde’s breast would have done just as well, or papa’s private parts, or 
the heart of one of the little bastards” (id., 49-50) 
57
 “(…) there was never anyone, anyone but me (…)” (id., 151). 
58
 “They say they, speaking of them, to make me think it is I who am speaking. Or I say they, speaking of 
God knows what, to make me think it is not I who am speaking” (id., 115). 
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from them so as to view them, as in the basic function of a camera: focusing the lens in 
accordance to the distance. But this is, again, to set up a distance. Maybe the question 
‘how to see the other?’ is inherently contradictory, or perhaps it is the wrong question.  
It seems that Beckett returning to the first inquiry (‘is madness different from 
reasonableness?’) from which he appears to suggest a solution, which will be mentioned 
later. In The Unnamable, the reader has to make a decision at the very beginning and 
agree, in a fictional pact, to believe in what he is reading in spite of all the absurdity and 
contradictions that may be encountered. As the reader, he is asked continuously to leave 
his expectations aside while welcoming the logic of the fictional universe that Beckett 
offers; in short, to become a nomadic reader59: read, understand, keep going, forget, 
move, read, forget, move, misunderstand, be still, unread, forget, read, reread, realize, 
remember, let go, etc. The nomadic reader understands that the unnamable exposes the 
fiction of the dichotomy mad/not-mad: the protagonist says that he has lost a leg in the 
war; that he has also lost his family because Malone and Mahood probably killed them in 
a complot; he claims that he cannot stop crying and that they have captured him in a jar. 
But, as soon as the reader wants to be empathetic with the unnamable, there is a voice at 
the back of his mind that prevents him because he has also read that the protagonist lost 
both legs, that he has no eyes, that he is lying, that he (maybe) is Mahood or/and Malone, 
that he may be dreaming, or that he does not exist. Therefore, on the one hand, the 
unnamable presents a coherent, logical, and credible speech (the discourse of the not-
mad); and, on the other, he makes fun of the reader in a macabre manner while he 
mumbles that one should not believe him (the discourse of the mad). What is even more 
incredible is that he presents both discourses at the very same time!  
                                                 
59
 Talking about the game of Go, Deleuze and Guattari explain that for the game “(…) it is a question of 
arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any 
point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, 
without departure or arrival” (ATP, 353). When I talk about a nomadic reader, I am suggesting that the 




Beckett uses tools of rationality to prove that rationality is not necessarily right about its 
conclusions and its methods. Given that mad/not-mad is a simulated dichotomy, Beckett 
suggests that there is no need to even utter it, and he perhaps is also proposing that to 
really see the other is not a matter of reducing distances but of becoming the other.60 
To become the other would imply to stop judging him/her/it and to cease imposing ways 
of reasoning (either in the form of a law or in the form of an aesthetic category) that do 
not come from himself; it would imply letting the other (=oneself) understand things as 
he/she/it pleases, because, as Beckett shows, the explanations of reality are not 
necessarily the reality itself and/or they are not always accurate. In a way, humans cannot 
do more than have a reduced point of view of things and for that we should expect that 
our elucidations are partial, just as even science cannot escape from retraction! 
That is likely why Beckett presents the unnamable as a reduced being with a reduced 
body and a reduced ability to think61, which is also evident in his reduced point of view: 
he can hardly see the outside world, and that only occurs when good Madeleine lifts the 
cover of the jar and cleans him (in the case where he is in a jar in front of the 
slaughterhouse…), as one observes in this extract: “Perhaps I am still under the tarpaulin: 
perhaps she flung it over me again (for fear of more snow in the night) while I was 
meditating” (The Unnamable, 80). This reduced point of view is noticeable not only at 
                                                 
60
 Sight and the distancing effect that maintains the other as Other and self as self. Deleuze and Guattari (in 
A Thousand Plateaus) talk about two modes of seeing: “optic” seeing (which “striates” space and maintains 
such oppositions) and “haptic” seeing, which is using the eye to touch and bring closer. 
61
 “I add this, to be on the safe side. These things I say, and shall say, if I can, are no longer, or are not yet, 
or never were, or never will be, or if they were, if they are, if they will be, were not here, are not here, will 
not be here, but elsewhere. But I am here. So I am obliged to add this. I who am here, who cannot speak, 
cannot think, and who must speak, and therefore perhaps think a little, cannot in relation only to me who 
am here, to here where I am, but can a little, sufficiently, I don’t know how, unimportant, in relation to me 
who was elsewhere, who shall be elsewhere and to those places where I was, where I shall be. But I have 
never been elsewhere, however uncertain the future. And the simplest therefore is to say that what I say, 
what I shall say, if I can, relates to the place where I am, to me who am there, in spite of my inability to 
think of these, or to speak of them, because of the compulsion I am under to speak of them, and therefore 
perhaps think of them a little. Another thing. What I say, what I may say, on this subject, the subject of me 
and my abode, has already been said since, having always been here, I am here still. At last a piece of 




the physical level (he cannot see much –or at all, as he also suggests) but also in the sense 
that he is impersonal, since he is repeating somebody else’s words, making his speech a 
mere citation of a voice behind him (the voice of the ventriloquists): “I have no language 
but theirs” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 52). Is there a more efficient way to show the 
partiality of an idea than attaching it to a body, a very specific type of body that cannot be 
linked to the norm and that questions (through its mere presence) official discourses? As 
Bloom argues, “The grotesque in art often reminds us that the body, with its smells, 
wastes, unruly appetites, and deformities, calls into question human idealisms and human 
pretensions” (Bloom, 11). 
The unnamable is not shy about being whatever he is being, especially if it means 
showing his grotesqueries and to discomfort the reader: “(…) alone perhaps the state of 
my skull, covered with pustules and bluebottles, these latter naturally abounding in such a 
neighborhood, preserved me from being an object of envy for many, and a source of 
discontent” (The Unnamable, 56). For Beckett the presence of a body that openly shows 
its natural or unnatural functions seems to be important, which expresses an unofficial 
speech, given that the grotesque body aims to subvert the vertical hierarchies of culture, 
placing individuals in the lower stratum of existence (in the material bodily stratum, 
instead of the heavenly one), since it is there where life is more abundant, productive, 
free, real, genuine. Through the use of the grotesque, he encourages rethinking 
definitions, hierarchies, models – to give new significance to things and people. As 
Bakhtin states, “[In the downward movement of the forms in the grotesque,] Objects are 
reborn in the light of the use made of them.” (Bakhtin, 374) The grotesque body can 
represent a means to anarchy; it celebrates the differences and the movement that 
prevents the authoritarian aims of official culture: 
“[The] grotesque form exercises [this] function: to consecrate inventive 
freedom, to permit the combination of a variety of different elements and 
their rapprochement, to liberate from the prevailing point of view of the 
world, from conventions and established truths, from clichés, from all that 
is humdrum and universally accepted. [It] offers the chance to have a new 
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outlook on the world, to realize the relative nature of all that exists, and to 
enter a completely new order of things.” (Bakhtin, 34) 
This also points out the absurdity of believing in metaphysical and religious forces. 
Hence, Beckett shows that reality is a multiplicity failed by laws, concepts, or faith, and 
that there are no essences of things, concepts or humans. Essences would need to exist on 
a metaphysical plane. Rather, there are relations and behaviours that can give some 
meaning within that very specific context, and even then only temporarily because one 
cannot expect the environment in its complexity to stay the same forever. For that reason, 
Beckett’s The Unnamable makes one wonder if people really are reasonable creatures, 
contradicting the sense of rightness and wrongness of one’s thoughts and presenting a 
character that is there in spite of his failure to rationalize the world: “Would it not be 
better if I were simply to keep on saying babababa, for example, while waiting to 
ascertain the true function of this venerable organ [the brain]?” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 
28) 
What happens when one’s assumptions of reality are threatened? One’s beliefs and values 
start losing certainty, and, even if they do not crumble, one begins to recognize the 
arbitrariness and trickery of power assemblages (hierarchies, morals, laws); even if one 
only seen in a blink of an eye, which is long enough to make them fissure,62 and to let 
creativity filter through the crack.  
The grotesque aims to shake the world as one sees it, especially in times where stability 
reigns. The writers of the grotesque want to build an alternative reality, and they do so by 
creating arbitrary connections or, most commonly, by proposing perverse deformations of 
reality. The goal is to cause an effect of astonishment in the reader, to show that this 
world is not safe or trustable; to wonder about certainties, beliefs and thoughts. Perhaps 
by putting things that are incompatible together, the grotesque does not evoke the 
                                                 
62
 “The crack-up ‘happens almost without your knowing it but is realized suddenly indeed’. This molecular 
line, more supple but no less disquieting, in fact, much more disquieting, is not simply internal or personal: 
it also brings everything into play, but on a different scale and in different forms, with segmentations of a 
different nature, rhizomatic instead of arborescent” (ATP, 199). 
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absurdity of putting them together, but it indeed shows that, given that they can be 
together, it is absurd to think that they are incompatible; that is, it shows the falsehood of 
naturalizing ideas in general, since ideas are simply and merely social (human) 
constructions, no matter how well organized and how solidified they appear to be.  
In The Unnamable Beckett displaces concepts from their ossified context of significance 
to give them back the possibility of new meaning -meaning something else: reason seems 
foolish and maybe folly is more trustworthy. He joins elements that are normally not 
found together, such as cruelty and compassion, sadness and happiness, fullness and 
nothingness, etc. He makes one fear (or at least inquire about) one’s own reality, breaking 
the logic of it and leaving clichés at the level of irresolution, which is “the logic of the 
grotesque” (Bakhtin, 107). Beckett plays with the limits of horror and delight, crosses the 
line that divides the allowed from the forbidden, making the reader laugh about horrific 
situations in a way that shocks expected reactions, thus giving new meaning to categories 
and showing the falsehood of any dichotomy. Beckett does not only confront prejudices 
and loathes that the readers take things for granted, but he also assures that the readers 
stop deceiving themselves by staggering elementary suppositions, so that they have to put 








Chapter 2  
2 A note on language 
“When I use a Word”, Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,  
“it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less”. 
“The question is”, said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things”. 
“The questions is”, said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that is all”. 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass. 
Language is any method of expression. Any system of signs used by humans in order to 
express themselves. Many things are involved in this simple definition: what is a sign? 
To what extent is expression related to communication? Is communication the replication 
of an ideology? Is the ‘grammatically correct’ use of language an expression of the 
ideology of the dominant class? Is one’s identity traceable through his idiolect or 
throughout the language of the socium to which one belongs? How many systems of 
communication should/can one consider when trying to give meaning to a message?  
There are two facts to emphasize: language is not restricted to the linguistic sign (either 
written or verbalized), and not all the meanings of nonverbal communication63 can be 
systematized (given that it is fundamentally phenomenal). However, if one cannot fix the 
meanings, how can he communicate? And another case: if one prioritizes the linguistic 
sign that can be fixed, how can its stagnation be avoided? There are many paradoxes 
inherent in the definition of language, among them its flexibility (its infinite creativity) 
and its rigor (its need to be fixed by rules); its arbitrariness and its consistency; its 
conventionality and its extraordinary production. It seems that no language can be 
restricted to its rules, in the same way that thinking cannot be oversimplified by defining 
                                                 
63
 Nonverbal communication includes: facial expressions; gestures; paralinguistics (accent, pitch, volume, 
rate, fluency, intonation, modulation, rhythm); kinesics (body language) and posture; proxemics (physical 
distance between communicators –shall one not forget the importance of territories?); oculesis (eye gaze); 
haptics (everything related to the sense of touch); appearance (color, clothing, jewelry); physiological 
changes (sweating, blinking, yawning); smells; chronemics (time); and silence. See De Vito, 134-157. 
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it as subvocal speech. That is to say, grammar will never be enough to explain the 
movement of langue64, since forms, orders, functions, and structures, are incapable of 
showing the immense vastness of language. And yet, there is a tendency to try to give 
meaning to everything as if putting-into-words, as if naming, gives the users control or 
possession over reality. 
In this chapter, I analyze how Beckett’s minoritarian uses of the word in The Unnamable 
problematize the conceptualization of the linguistic sign. He asks questions such as: does 
expression have to carry a message?; can expression not carry a message?; and, since the 
relation of the word and its lexical meaning is totally arbitrary and conventional (even 
onomatopoeic change from language to language), how can one single person introduce 
newness to it? 
Beckett has contraposed his text against majoritarian discourses and, because of that, he 
has managed to resist the tyranny of the stagnation of the word (which largely contributes 
to the production of social truths, meanings, and identities). I argue that Beckett engages 
in a creative process by which he dissolves ‘language’ and human identity.  
Before proceeding, I would like to indicate that in Kafka, Toward a Minor Literature, 
Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between minoritarian and majoritarian literature, linking 
the former to a force of production, revolution, and deterritorialization through language. 
They argue that minor literature resists a priori conceptualizations, since it aims to break 
forms and petrified uses of language, making possible the manifestation of lines of escape 
that can free the word. It is in this sense that minoritarian uses of the linguistic sign not 
only crack major language, but also have repercussions in the social assemblages to 
which that language belongs, making established discourses destabilized. To summarize, 
they characterize minor literature as follows:  
                                                 
64
 Ferdinand de Saussure, a French linguist, centers not on individual utterances but on the underlying rules 
and conventions that enable language to operate. He focuses on grammar rather than usage; rules rather 




“The three characteristics of minor literature are the deterritorialization 
of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, 
and the collective assemblage of enunciation. We might as well say that 
minor no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary 
conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or 
established) literature.” (Kafka…, 18) 
In turn, Sarduy’s Cobra also challenges social norms and the meanings of signs by 
presenting universes that contradict institutionalized assemblages. Sarduy, however, does 
it in a different manner: whereas Beckett empties65 language, Sarduy works by 
saturation. Sarduy’s use of language is voluptuous, exaggerated, erotic: by expressing a 
single phenomenon in so many different ways he shows the vulnerability and malleability 
of meanings. He shows how there are numerous manners of expressing the same content, 
and how the relation expression-message-content is not univocal and necessary. Both 
writers question this relation: they present forms of expression that are lacking a message 
and, therefore, do not harbor content (signification)66. They do so by creating novel forms 
of expression, by deterritorializing major uses of language, by hating all languages of 
masters.  
On the other hand, I would say that Donoso’s El obsceno pájaro de la noche is a special 
case of resisting power, given that he does so in a more subtle fashion. His text is an 
expression of the less explored sides of social constructions, and for that Donoso 
problematizes concepts such as ideologies and stereotypes, building fictional universes 
that are open to those marginal states of human expression that are normally ignored: the 
deterritorialized behaviours. Whereas Sarduy focuses mainly on the figure of the 
transvestite, Donoso centers his novel on the elderly and the ugly (monstrous). He tells 
                                                 
65
 Deleuze says that “[Beckett] proceeds by dryness and sobriety, a willed poverty, pushing 
deterritorialization to such an extreme that nothing remains but intensities” (Kafka…, 18). 
66
 As Deleuze and Guattari tell: “[for] minor literature (…) it is expression that precedes contents, whether 
to prefigure the rigid forms into which contents will flow or to make them take flight along lines of escape 
or transformation” (Kafka…, 85). 
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the readers that there is a point where major culture blocks the forms of expression of 
minorities, transforming the social productions of these groups into symbols of threat, 
distrust and repulsion, given that they expose the arbitrariness of the official culture and 
its prejudices, beliefs, truths, and rules. 
 
2.1 He wrote his did 
Coming back to the statement that opened this chapter, let me ask again: what does one 
refer to when one says ‘language’? Language is anything that helps us, as users, to 
communicate; it has to be related to a context and it uses a system of signs. So, in reality 
one should better say ‘languages’, because there is never only one: body language, sign 
language, spoken language, braille, musical language, mathematical language, etc. I am 
talking about heterogeneous systems of communication that are connected in many ways. 
And the complexities do not stop there: many times users use them intentionally 
(consciously) and other times unintentionally (unconsciously).  
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to simplify them in order to explain them and, as a 
consequence, with each systematization of a language comes a reduction of it. To try to 
explain a sentence only from its syntactical elements is to destroy it in a movement of 
abstraction that detaches it from the reality of production. As Deleuze and Guattari state:  
“The linguistic tree on the Chomsky model still begins at a point S and 
proceeds by dichotomy. On the contrary, not every trait in a rhizome is 
necessarily linked to a linguistic feature: semiotic chains of every nature 
are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, 
economic, etc.) that bring into play not only different regimes of signs but 
also states of things of differing status. Collective assemblages of 
enunciation function directly within machinic assemblages; it is not 
impossible to make a radical break between regimes of signs and their 
objects.” (ATP, 28) 
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In this sense some scholars, Barthes and Chomsky, for instance, have criticized, on the 
one hand, the supposed arbitrariness of written language, and some others, such as 
Derrida for instance, on the other, have criticized the inclination to homogenize and 
prioritize certain meanings over others (logocentrism67). To try to answer the question 
“what did she want to say?” is a question that goes beyond an elementary attempt to put 
together the meaning of every word and add it to the statement. An interpretation should 
include as many elements of the diverse and wide context (or contexts) as possible and 
must remain incomplete. Interpretations are, therefore, partial, unfixed, and provisional.  
One should also consider all those extra-linguistic elements (“assemblages that are not 
principally linguistic” (ATP, 132)) that accompany every word that is uttered (what 
Saussure called parole), because they modify (in intensity?) its meanings and, let us not 
forget that we are human: words give us emotion. 
It is not the same to tell somebody “Be careful” in a soft voice, with a smile on the face, 
and relaxed muscles; and to tell him “Be careful” holding a bloody knife, using a 
threatening voice, and running towards him. Smells, distance, volume, tone, yawns, 
prosody, blinks, a fake laughter (attitude –intentional), joy, a rictus of disgust (emotion –
unintentional), and similar forms of non-linguistic expression are all important. In 
communication everything matters, to quote Deleuze and Guattari, “Hence the necessity 
of a return to pragmatics, in which language never has universality in itself, self-
sufficient formalization, a general semiology, or a meta-language” (ATP, 132). The 
pragmatics of Deleuze and Guattari show how languages meet the rules (generative) and, 
at the same time, how they forget the rules (transformational) –or what Saussure called 
mutability and immutability. However, they add two other components to the regime of 
signs: the diagrammatic and the machinic, which are related to the map (diagram of the 
abstract machines) and the territory (program of agency).  
                                                 
67
 “Western philosophy after Plato was centered around the impossible but irresistible search for a 
fundamental Truth or Logos. Derrida calls this search ‘logocentrism’” (Leitch, 2037). 
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The uses of language come first and are followed by its systematizations (grammars and 
other assemblages of power), not the other way around, which implies that, when one 
uses a language in an ideal situation, ways must be found to represent what actual 
situations are presenting. That is why one intends to simulate these features using 
emoticons when texting someone on a cell phone: to try to ‘complete’ the meaning of 
what is being expressed. That is also why new words are added to the dictionary, and 
why literary genres see their borders disappearing.  
Deleuze and Guattari are defending those modes of communication that have been 
marginalized in favor of the tyrannical regime of the signifier. However there is 
something that makes me struggle: how can one produce anything without having a 
referent, a starting point? It seems that they are criticizing the signifiers that are the 
interpretation of the interpretation of the interpretation… and so on; but there is no 
denotative meaning as such. Each use of a linguistic sign is indeed an interpretation of the 
sign, in a way that signs are constantly becoming signs of signs. And as they also admit, 
there is not a level zero of signification; the issue is not to pretend that one can start as a 
literal tabula rasa, but to experiment within language and create new forms of expression 
and new meanings.  
In a way there is a need to fight the “universal abstraction” (the despotic and the 
authoritarian regimes of sign), but if all users go to the other extreme and become “the 
most deterritorialized line, the line of the scapegoat, (…) the line of our subjectivity” 
(ATP, 143), we would all be moving to Babel, or rather to somewhere else: to a place full 
of individualities and without collectivities.  
What about literary language? I will continue this section with one quotation:  
“We will never ask what a book means, as signified or signifier; we will 
not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions 
with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit 
intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and 
metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it makes its own 
converge.” (ATP, 25) 
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One should not look for a meaning within a text; but one still does. We all are, in that 
sense, a little bit paranoid because we like to look for teleological meanings everywhere; 
we crave for despotic signs that allow us to take a break, to not be vulnerable, to be 
included in a conversation. Are Deleuze and Guattari suggesting, then, a passionate 
approach: a reading that interiorizes the book itself and its meanings? Not likely, because, 
even if passionate regimes eliminate interpretations, they do not produce new meanings 
(“[The interpretation] disappears entirely in favor of a pure and literal recitation 
forbidding the slightest change, addition, or commentary (…) Or else interpretation 
survives but becomes internal to the book itself, which loses its circulatory function for 
outside elements.” (ATP, 148)). 
It appears that extra linguistic features cannot be incorporated in a literary text as easily 
as they can be included in another semiotic system, given that literature depends mainly 
on written words. Not exclusively, but mostly. Nevertheless, how can one make words, 
these linguistic signs, mean more that they do? How is it possible to build an empty-sign 
(full of potential), through the poetic function of language, beyond its referential 
function?  
Barthes, in The Pleasure of The Text, argues that one can provide the linguistic sign with 
new, original, and creative meanings.68 What one has to do is become a reader not in 
pleasure but in bliss69, so as to hear the sound of silence, which is what remains in the 
                                                 
68
 “How can the text ‘get itself out’ of the war of fictions, of sociolects? –by a gradual labor of extenuation. 
First, the text liquidates all metalanguage (…). Next, the text destroys utterly, to the point of contradiction, 
its own discursive category, its sociolinguistic reference (its ‘genre’): it is ‘the comical that does not make 
us laugh,’ the irony which does not subjugate, the jubilation without soul, without mystique (Sarduy), 
quotation without quotation marks. Lastly, the text can, if it wants, attack the canonical structures of the 
language itself (Sollers): lexicon (exuberant neologisms, portmanteau words, transliterations), syntax (no 
more logical cell, no more sentence)” (Barthes, The Pleasure…, 30-31). 
69
 “With the writer of bliss (and his reader) begins the untenable text, the impossible text. This text is 
outside pleasure, outside criticism, unless it is reached through another text of bliss: you cannot speak ‘on’ 
such a text, you can only speak ‘in’ it, in its fashion, enter into a desperate plagiarism, hysterically affirm 
the void of bliss (and no longer obsessively repeat the letter of pleasure)” (Barthes, The Pleasure…, 22). 
The writer and reader of bliss try to remove meanings from the ‘repetition of the letter’ by circulating the 
text with other texts of bliss (that are also escaping the law, for they are moving away from the regime of 
the signifier). The reader of bliss would therefore be a molecular reader.  
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sign after letting it go nude (empty). Emptiness and nothingness are used here in the 
sense of going back to the potential of the word, which allows creativity and novelty and 
opens ways for new connections; that is, dismantling the fixed significations that 
reinforce molar meanings.  
For Barthes, the distinction between pleasure and bliss is very important: pleasure would 
still refer to what Deleuze and Guattari call molar assemblages, while joy would refer to 
molecular assemblages. According to Barthes, one should never apologize, one should 
not explain himself and one should embrace the paradoxes of creating meaning: in the 
first place, he should acknowledge himself as an individual who is part of social 
assemblages and, at the same time, an expression of what-is-not (nothingness). He 
suggests that one places his readings between the distancing and the approaching, on the 
border. Beckett’s The Unnamable  is an example of this type of text, which is a text of 
bliss, given that it “imposes a state of loss [and] discomfort” (Barthes, The Pleasure…, 
14). Beckett’s writing is neither personalized nor unified, because it does not emphasize a 
specific point of view more than any other, and because events unfold into their 
potentiality without needing to condense into an actual fact; it is rhizomatic given that it 
opens itself to simultaneous discourses without ceding priority to any of them, and since 
it lets itself be crossed by a multitude of intensities. His writing affirms A, its negation, 
and the sum of them (not the synthesis). He does not have to select between terms, since 
he has managed to include them all “passing through the entire set of possibilities” (ECC, 
111). The Unnamable, an untenable and impossible text70, resists interpretation and 
demands to be experienced.  
This is how literature can re-signify the linguistic sign: by virtue of tracing the lines of 
flight of the words and recognizing that agencies territorialize their meanings and, 
simultaneously, reterritorialize them (preferably to a maximum of deterritorialization). 
Some literary texts show us “that every system is in variation and is defined not by its 
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 Deleuze says that Beckett “invent[s] a minor use of the major language within which [he] express[es] 
[himself] entirely; [he] minorize[s] this language, much as in music, where the minor mode refers to 
dynamic combinations in perpetual disequilibrium. (…) This exceeds the possibilities of speech and attains 
the power of the language, or even of language in its entirety” (ECC, 109).   
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constants and homogeneity but on the contrary by a variability whose characteristics are 
immanent, continuous, and regulated in a very specific mode (…)” (ATP, 114-115). That 
is, even if systems need to systematize and try to freeze the production of language, they 
should also include the variations because language is constantly morphing and, if they 
only considered the constants, they would be moving away from the language that they 
are taking as reference, perhaps to the point where they would not even have much to do 
with each other. However, sometimes variations are ignored for the sake of preserving 
the status of power in a system, and so much so that one can think that the movement of 
production is the other way around – from the system that dictates the rules to the users 
who apply them. It seems that ‘creativity’ has been captured and filtered through the 
grammatically correct71 law; consequently, the further away from the rule that a text 
becomes, the more censored it will be. Grammatically correct becomes a marker of 
power and, for that, it asks for submission. Therefore, one needs to forget revolutionary 
desires in order to belong to an institution that demands replication and obedience.  
In spite of the canons and the power of major literature, some minor writers have 
managed to go beyond the impositions of the law, realizing that writing not only becomes 
an escape from major discourses, but also that writing is a machine that can fight for the 
inclusion of minor discourses, and, as a result, of minor assemblages. Agrammaticality 
can be a way out of the law, since agrammatical constructions within literature, through 
disturbance, perplexity, and confusion, rebuild written language and give it a meaningful 
spin in a way that makes it necessary to rethink words, their uses and their meanings.  
 
2.2 Beckett’s literature of the unword 
Some words are untranslatable, no matter how many tricks, accents, tones, extensions, 
connotations, and figures one wants to add to them. If anything, one only manages to 
make them obscure or pompous. Some ideas cannot be named, they are buttery, watery, 
                                                 
71
 Even if in language “There are no preexisting rules, each move invents its own rules” (LOS, 59). 
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airy, … The same thing can be said about some literary texts, especially those that 
purposely aim to free the word, making it light or empty. Beckett’s The Unnamable is a 
notable example that shows how words can be repositioned in their original place (after 
fighting for the removal of all cohesive and accumulated immovable meanings): 
presence. I say “original place” not in the sense of a beginning, but in the sense of the 
fundamental value of the word, to express and communicate (not to repeat and mirror). 
That originality, in my opinion, can only be reached when words become presentation (as 
opposed to representation) and obtain the strength to be creative and novel.  
Beckett is problematizing the concepts of signification, connotation, function, form, etc., 
of the word as linguistic sign not to show that communication is impossible, but to 
demonstrate that, in order to communicate, one has to disrupt major discourses and try to 
free the words, maybe even to become a flux with them, to evolve with them, die with 
them, and eventually let them leave (when they cross the subject). However, one may 
ask: how can paths for newness within a language be opened if one is unavoidably 
constrained by that language? Maybe by constantly moving on and by resisting the 
simulacrum of permanence; perhaps by destroying oldness; possibly by showing the 
insufficiency of reducing words to a representational function; maybe by introducing 
elements of disruption (for instance, agrammaticality) to the system; perhaps by putting 
language “into a state of boom, close to a crash?” (ECC, 109) 
Beckett explains that he wanted to remove rhetorical resources from his texts, in an 
attempt to leave the words clear, nude, in their smallest (/biggest?) capacity for 
expression; to explore the process of construction of signification transforming language 
into an unreliable sign that can only mumble and annul itself72. This is why Beckett’s 
writing restores language to its origin, to the nervous stuttering that precedes the certitude 
of the word. He purposely wants to have weak prose, to not be right and to embrace 
paradox, so that he could disintegrate the word (formed meanings) and emulate silence 
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 In an interview with Georges Duthuit, Beckett’s says: “[preferring] the expression that there is nothing 
to express, nothing with which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the 
obligation to express” (Esslin, 17). 
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(unformed meanings), as Deleuze explains: “When a language is so strained that it starts 
to stutter, or to murmur or stammer… then language in its entirety reaches the limit that 
marks its outside and makes it confront silence.” (ECC, 113). Beckett wanted to give 
expression to the impossible, and this is why he unnames73. 
 
2.2.1 Becoming nomadic 
In The Unnamable the immobile voyage of the protagonist, the unnamable, places the 
importance of the trip within his own thoughts, whose best medium, and simultaneously 
only limit, are words. However, this immobility is, paradoxically, full of movement. 
Although the protagonist cannot physically move (because he is in a jar), nevertheless he 
does not stop draining his possibilities of becoming something else, by remaining as 
uncondensed form (i.e., by staying impossible). He is a constant wandering that crosses 
states, intensities, and forms, on the only condition of not interrupting his own flow. 
His unceasing and directionless metamorphosis prevents the adherence of ideas such as 
progress, success, identity, etc., given that such concepts would call for the existence of 
certain coordinates (a starting point, a middle point, an end point; in short, a hierarchical 
order). This ongoing motion without purpose not only implies that one is never lost, 
wrong, far, better, close or in a detour; but also that one’s location cannot be traced (does 
not need to be traced?), because the importance is in the direction of the displacement, in 
the unceasing flowing more than in the formed objects. Deleuze and Guattari differentiate 
between these two types of space: they call the goal-orientated one, that is organized and 
homogeneous, striated space; and the ‘open’, that is amorphous and heterogeneous, 
smooth space. They add that “all progress is made by and in striated space, but all 
becoming occurs in smooth space” (ATP, 487), since in the former there are fixed points 
of reference and organized properties that channel the journey, helping to classify and 
                                                 
73
 “Language names the possible” (ECC, 156). 
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graduate progression; whereas the latter is formed by acentered intensities that vary in an 
erratic way, allowing the flux to flow. 
I previously said that the unnamable’s immobility is full of movement. His 
metamorphosis could not happen any other way for two reasons: he is exhausted74, and 
his trip is not measureable and constrainable.75   
It seems that body, language and thoughts are linked in the unnamable since one can 
observe that inasmuch as his body does not condense, his thoughts remain nomadic and 
his language stutters more than it says; that is, everything wanders as part of the same 
flux, in a pre-significant expression. This is why he remains impossible, since he is away 
from the static regimes of the signifier.  
 
2.2.2 Becoming unnamed 
Beckett’s language is becoming detached from the structure of social reality, in particular 
from the reality of capitalism and its forces that transform everything into commodities 
and try to insert all utterances into the labour machine. This distancing from majoritarian 
discourses does not deny the importance of pragmatics, rather it attempts to undo the 
processes of construction of meaning to put words back in a pre-signifying position. That 
is, the movement is going backwards to the construction of meanings to show that 
stagnated significances can be broken, as opposed to returning to isolate the word and 
propose that it can work magically without a context of production, without interrelating 
with other linguistic and extra-linguistic instances. Beckett pushes language to a 
molecular limit to show that signification is arbitrary, not a necessity in any case. 
                                                 
74
 “One can exhaust the joys, the movements, and the acrobatics of the life of the mind only if the body 
remains immobile, curled up, seated, somber, itself exhausted (…)”  (ECC, 169).   
75
 “Voyage in place: that is the name of all intensities (…)” (ATP, 482). 
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This is why one can say that his language attempts to break the bonds to the immediate 
association world-thing/language-thing, trying to reclaim its self-referential features. 
Beckett’s language frees itself from any teleological expectation (anticipated meanings, 
anticipated functions, and anticipated destinies), becoming, in this way, a language that 
may actually say something: in more accurate words Beckett’s language, due to its 
constant movement, is a becoming rather than a being, a presentation rather than a 
representation; it’s a nomadic unconstrainable flux that cannot be fixed to a deictic “I” in 
a form that is more important than “you”, “she”, etc., thus eliminating the importance of 
the subject that expresses. In short, his language does not go towards any particular 
meaning and does not want to be the spokesman of an individual voice. 
What is his language? Given that it is not a holder of messages, it becomes a limit76 – an 
open space of possibilities and a flux that does not condensate (it does not have semantic 
density - it’s a molecular language). As it does not pursue a final destination (meaning), it 
does not dry up: it is a movement without end and is always fresh. I face here a number 
of important implications: 1) I would not necessarily argue that the limits of Beckett’s 
language do not exist, but rather they are constantly displaced; 2) an inexhaustible 
language suggests that it is not important to trace a beginning and an end. Am I talking 
about an “infinite language” that goes beyond spatial and temporal boundaries? Only in 
the sense that it is not constrained by the limits of signification, and that it would be the 
expression of intensities. Hence, one could say that Beckett’s language goes beyond the 
construction of meaning and content, losing its thickness: it is both the subject of the 
utterance and the object of the utterance: “How, in such conditions, can I write (to 
consider only the manual aspect of that bitter folly)? I don't know. I could know. But I 
shall not know. Not this time. It is I who write, who cannot raise my hand from my knee” 
(Beckett, The Unnamable, 11). 
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 This limit would be an abstract idea in the sense of the absolute zero on the Kelvin scale. Whereas 
scientists have never been able to measure it in a laboratory or in nature, they know that it theoretically 
exists even if it is impossible to reach that temperature. Why? In the first place, they would need to have a 
thermometer that was already in the absolute zero, so that it would not transmit heat to other objects.  
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The importance is, thus, placed in movements (verbs)77 more than in destinations 
(nouns). It is because of this motion that the unnamable can evoke a nub from a lost hand, 
an anus, an egg, or a demon. What matters is the continuous flux of words; 3) this 
purposeless movement means that there is no time/place to build a body with its organs, 
or, in other words, that the subject dissolves. This is why Beckett’s The Unnamable is 
alien to the world, to (human) beings and to language itself. 
 
2.3 Cobra: Forked tongue, forked language 
In Sarduy’s Cobra one would need to talk about several narrators, since the narrative 
voice changes at various times and, as a result, also the focalization. I can recognize at 
least three narrators: one in the first person singular, which could be identified with the 
voice of the protagonist; one in the first person plural78; and, one in the third person 
singular. The latter is a very peculiar narrator: he breaks the fictional pact, crossing the 
limits of fiction to go beyond them and talk to the reader:   
Stupid reader: even if with these hints, brutal as posts, you have not 
understood that it is a metamorphosis of the previous chapter’s painter –
pay attention to the gestures of the occupation that remain within him–, 
drop this novel and become a salesman or read novels from the Boom, that 
are much clearer.79 
                                                 
77
 “The Verb (…) expresses in language all events in one; [it] expresses the event of language –language 
being a unique event which merges now with that which renders it possible” (LOS, 185). 
78
 In “Eat Flowers!” there is a sudden irruption of this narrator. Besides the fact that he narrates in the form 
‘we’, his speech is more coherent and clear –less baroque– than the rest of the narration. Conf. Sarduy, 
174-176.  
79
 “Tarado lector: si aun con estas pistas, groseras como postes, no has comprendido que se trata de una 
metamorfosis del pintor del capítulo anterior –fíjate si no cómo le han quedado los gestos del oficio– 
abandona esta novela y dedícate al templete o a leer las del Boom, que son mucho más claras” (Sarduy, 
footnote in Cobra, 66). 
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By leaving the fictional universe where the narrator is supposed to stay, he challenges 
literary canons and reader’s abilities to leave his comfort zone. He also confronts the 
reader by calling him ‘stupid’. This narrator is assuming that the reader may not have 
recognized the metamorphosis to which he is alluding. He is also assuming that the 
reader knows what the Boom is. Lastly, he is setting up a difference between the novels 
of the Boom and the ones of the so-called Postboom, implying his opinion about the 
Boom (that it is clearer and easier than the Postboom). For these reasons, one should be 
aware that this narrator is subversive and cheeky.  
On the other hand, this narrator offers the readers his version of what occurs in the novel 
– that the characters transform. Actually, the readers were most likely already aware of 
the metamorphoses undergone by the protagonist and by the Señora; however, he 
insinuates that there may be others that the readers are missing. What if the members of 
the motorcycle gang are indeed the actors of the “Lyrical Puppet Theater”? What if the 
monks that Cobra encounters are the members of the motorcycle gang? Should the 
readers expect the narrator to give them more hints? Overall, should one believe what he 
said in the first place?  
Let us not believe him, because he thinks that we, the readers, are stupid and we want to 
prove him wrong. Therefore, by invalidating what he says, we remove from his quality of 
being able to know everything that is happening in the novel (omniscient narrator), which 
would imply either that he is incapable of giving a true account of the incidents or that he 
is so close to the occurrences that he loses perspective. The first case would explain why 
he keeps talking throughout the novel about Cobra as if she/he had not have died and why 
he constantly forgets that he is repeating himself throughout the chapters (unintentional 
quotation). It would also imply that the narration is partially filtered by his distortions, to 
the point that what he presents as absurd may only be his incompetence to see the 
congruence. Should one conclude that he is not trustworthy?  
The second case, in turn, would insinuate that his sight is blurry. He is not having an 
‘optical perception’ but rather a haptic one, that is to say, a type of perception that 
considers the connections between events more that the formation of things. Therefore, 
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the narration would be a map of intensities more than a sequence of facts; it would be a 
diagram of the connections rather than the organized account of a story. This would 
explain a few things: that Cobra keeps appearing throughout the novel because he/she is a 
flow that sometimes may look dead and in other times may look alive; and, that one reads 
the same fragment several times all over the novel because that specific fragment is the 
expression of a force (anger, sadness, bliss, etc.); last, that rational/irrational are pointless 
adjectives to describe the movements of reality, given that when one talks about 
intensities it is unnecessary to introduce social dichotomies such as true/false. In this 
instance, it would not be a matter of believing or not, but a matter of experiencing within 
the reading. 
Going back to the original question, if one says that he is an omniscient narrator and that 
he knows for sure, like the back of his hand, the episodes in question, this would imply 
that his words can be trusted and that the narrator is deliberately being mischievous and 
perverse. Furthermore, this would suggest that he is an alchemist god, and that the 
readers are bearing witness to how he creates, destroys, and recreates his universes80 
whose inhabitants are mere puppets that go through his Machiavellian investigations. It 
would not be a coincidence, then, that they are in a lyrical theater: they are indeed on 
stage; they are acting, personifying a transvestite, a monk, a motorcyclist, etc. This is to 
say, the theater would be the space where experimentations take place: Cobra is 
sometimes playing a she, and sometimes a he; Cobra’s role is, at times, to be a dead 
character, and at others to be a live persona; the narrator repeats certain fragments of the 
text because they are part of the scenario; the narration is not a sequence of events but a 
collection of individual episodes81. Here reliability is not brought into question, but our 
abilities to join the game.  
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 In “White Dwarf” the narrator is describing when La Señora and El Maestro (the body painter) were 
trying to enlarge Pup’s body. His narration gives the impression that he is not there and that he is not 
participating in the episode; however, he complains about Pup’s yells. (Ref. Sarduy, 70) He is, again, 
breaking the bounders of fiction, but this time going inside it. 
81
 One would not be encountering a novel formed by a series of actions a, b, c, d, e. One would be facing a 
compilation of different “takes” of the same scene  a, a’, a’’, a’’’, a’’’’’ –whose elements can vary leading 
to different results, since it is an experiment.  
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Finally, there is a last option: what if there is only one narrator that relentlessly 
metamorphoses his features? What if the narrator is nomadic and he builds different 
expressions for different types of speech? Probably this narrator is an expression of the 
narration itself, given that narrator, narration, characters, space, time, and plot are within 
the same flow. This narrator cracks language not by using agrammatical language, but by 
making language exuberant and voluptuous. With this narrator, the narration is excessive; 
it makes the words bubble; it is saturated with repetitions, quotes, intra-texts, hyper-texts; 
it is in a form of waste82.  
In this novel, language does not deny anything, and the reader becomes ravenous; to 
quote Barthes: “more, more, still more! one more word, one more celebration.” (Barthes, 
The Pleasure of the Text, 8) In Cobra, where one is given everything, where one does not 
need to choose83, Sarduy is opening language to new connections, by presenting it 
altogether with all its possibilities. The process of building meaning is overwhelmed, so 
that one meaning also includes a multiplicity of meanings84, which would imply, at the 
end of the day, that signification becomes almost nonsignifying.  
Something similar occurs with the characters who lack stable identity, given that every 
one of them seems to be a multitude of characters; this is shown not only through their 
evident metamorphoses, but also through their numerous names, masks, customs, sexes, 
activities, likings, affiliations, etc. That is to say, it becomes complicated to systematize 
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 As Sarduy mentions in an interview with Jean-Michel Fossey: “To waste, to squander, to throw away 
language only as a function of pleasure (…). [Within Cobra] language, in opposition to its domestic use, is 
not functioning to inform but to give pleasure; it is an attack on the good sense, moralistic and ‘natural’, in 
which the ideology of consumption and accumulation is based.” / “Malgastar, dilapidar, derrochar lenguaje 
únicamente en función del placer (…). [En Cobra] el lenguaje, contrariamente a su uso doméstico, no se 
encuentra en función de información sino en función de placer, es un atentado al buen sentido, moralista y 
‘natural’ en que se basa toda la ideología del consumo y la acumulación” (Mora; Ortega; Barthes; et al., 
16). 
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 Deleuze says that Beckett “(…) took this art of inclusive disjunction to its highest point, an art that no 
longer selects but affirms (…)” (ECC, 110 -111) I think that the same can be said about Sarduy.  
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 “The autonomy of writing, that is to say, of writing as a specific system with its own laws, is not 
circumscribed to any meaning, but open to a multiplicity of meanings”. / “La autonomía de la escritura, o 
sea la escritura como sistema específico sujeto a sus propias leyes, no circunscritas a ningún significado, 
sino abierta a una multiplicidad de significados” (Mora; Ortega; Barthes; et al., 39). 
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all the possibilities and to draw a center that would work as a reference to ground the 
options. On the other hand, the fact not a single subject exists but a multiplicity calls for a 
nomadic narrator that can give expression to all of them. 
Additionally, the narrator(s) in Cobra introduces, along slips into the text, his ideas on 
the process of writing. He says: writing is the art of ellipsis; the art of digression; the art 
of delighting in reality; the art of restoring History; the art of breaking an order and 
creating a disorder; and, the art of patching-up.85 I would add: writing is the art of 
presenting. Sarduy shows in his novel that writing is a process that should not be reduced 
to representation, since it has the capacity to express the immediacy, the novelty, and the 
original creation of life. For this to happen, the writer needs to catch up with the lines of 
flight of language –or he himself must create a fissure within language. Sarduy makes of 
Cobra a great book, because even if Spanish was his mother tongue, he wrote it in a kind 
of foreign language.  
He did not make himself into a good writer by recounting his memories, giving his 
opinions or building a style, he went beyond:  
“when it is a matter of digging under the stories, cracking open the 
opinions, and reaching regions without memories, when the self must be 
destroyed, it is certainly not enough to be a “great” writer, and the means 
must remain forever inadequate. Style becomes nonstyle, and one’s 
language lets an unknown foreign language escape from it, so that one can 
reach the limits of language itself and become something other than a 
writer, conquering fragmented visions that pass through the words of a 
poet, the colors of a painter, or the sounds of a musician.” (ECC, 113) 
                                                 
85
 “La escritura es el arte de la elipsis.”, “La escritura es el arte de la digresión.”, “La escritura es el arte de 
recrear la realidad.”, “La escritura es el arte de restituir la Historia.”, “La escritura es el arte de 




In Cobra, narration and narrator (as part of the same flow) are both slippery, leaving the 
reader with no other option but to become part of the ‘verbal joy’, leaving behind 
prejudices and embracing the jubilation –becoming a reader of bliss86.  
 
2.4 Muted speeches in El Obsceno  
I would like to start this section by going back to the distinction between minoritarian and 
majoritarian literature. As I mentioned earlier, for Deleuze and Guattari minoritarian 
literature is related to a creative force that challenges and deterritorializes major uses of 
language, and because minoritarian uses of language are not constrained to the norms of 
major discourses, they consequently resist power assemblages (political, religious, 
economical, etc.). Donoso’s El obsceno is a book of resistance, on the one hand, for the 
writer himself, given that prior to this book he wrote in the style of (magic) realism, and, 
on the other hand, for the novel as genre, since it has challenged the canon without 
allowing a re-territorialization –that is to say, El obsceno does not propose a new norm 
for the novel, but rather it opens the potentiality of the novel as such. Furthermore, his 
novel is political in the sense that it explores marginalized discourses at least in the 
following instances, as Gutiérrez Mouat asserts: servant, feminine, poverty, magic, 
religion, monster, and old women’s discourses (Finnegan, xxi). Traditionally, these 
discourses have been, in the best of the cases, ignored, and recurrently attacked, censored 
or neutralized; they have been disregarded because they do not contribute to useful forces 
of production and because they are very fructiferous when it comes to eluding 
systematizations. Of all these marginalized discourses, there is one that is particularly 
productive in the aforementioned novel: the discourse of old women.  
                                                 
86 The translator of The Pleasure of the Text, notes that “pleasure is a state [and] bliss (jouissance) an 
action” (Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, vi), i.e. the reader of bliss has to work in order to overcome his 
petrified ideas and conceptualizations. Barthes describes the moment of bliss as follows: “Imagine someone 
(…) who abolishes within himself all barriers, all classes, all exclusions, not by syncretism but by simple 
discard of that old specter (…)” (Barthes, The Pleasure… 3). 
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2.4.1 Witch(like) old women  
The relation that Donoso sets between witches and women has been studied previously; 
and Donoso was not the first who connect women to witchcraft. This connection has a 
deep-rooted tradition in western culture, and is a recurring trope even in contemporary 
cultural productions. For instance, in the film by Lars von Trier, Antichrist, the plot 
suggests this linkage and proposes that the female protagonist is being taken over by her 
inner-witch, who is causing the emergence of incomprehensible and obscure behaviours 
within her. The epilogue, as well, makes a tribute to the uncountable and nameless 
women who were killed under the premise of eradicating this horror –being a ‘witch’. 
Years before, the Mexican Carlos Fuentes wrote Aura, a novel that also used the motif of 
the witch; he started his text with this quotation by Jules Michelet: “Man hunts and 
struggles. Woman intrigues and dreams; she is the mother of fantasy, the mother of the 
gods. She has second sight, the wings that enable her to fly to the infinite of desire and 
the imagination…”, which indicates that traditionally men have been related to those 
discourses of rationality that can be proved, reproduced and organized, whereas women 
have been associated to mystical, mysterious, and chaotic means of expression.  
Women are a minority and their discourses (because they are different) threaten the law. 
Their modes of expression differ from the ways of the majority and for that they are 
marginalized. The law (which, in the Western imaginary, is been related to rationality) 
tends to link women’s productions and perspectives with that which is not-rational: 
mystery, witchery, madness, mysticism, etc. I do not intend to analyze this stereotype or 
to study how it is constructed; rather I only refer to the link witchery/women to relate it 
with minoritarian discourses and to see how majoritarian instances try to supress its ways 
of expression, but cannot –desire always comes first and works in complex manners, and 
neither science and philosophy nor magic are sufficient systems to grasp it all.   
In El obsceno, Donoso portrays the elder women who live in La Casa not only as 
witchlike, but also as creatures who possess supernatural powers. Here I need to stop to 
make a brief note: it seems that within the novel, among the female characters the ways 
of existence are going to diverge into two main modes, the witch and the bitch –or a mix 
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of both. I am mainly interested in the literal sense of the word bitch87, given that I believe 
that both protagonists (Mudito/Humberto and Peta/Inés) metamorphosize into dogs. Now, 
closing the digression, I would like to begin with the case of Peta/Inés, two female 
characters who are constantly transforming one into another: when Inés wanted to get 
pregnant, when Mudito sends Peta to a madhouse, when they both were knitting clothes 
for Boy, etc. Moreover, it is suggested that Peta, using magic, transforms herself into the 
yellow dog of La Rinconada and the yellow plastic dog of the Dog Track: 
Inés = Peta = yellow (plastic) dog 
This yellow female dog and Inés/Peta become the way out, a line of escape, from which 
major discourses of La Rinconada start cracking, because they are the forces against the 
patriarchal structures embodied in the figure of Don Jerónimo, the cacique; in the figures 
of the male black dogs, the guardians of order who keep unwelcome elements outside the 
territory of La Rinconada; in the figure of Don Clemente, the representative of the family 
with God; etc. The novel criticizes the way in which major discourses (in this example, 
patriarchy) aim to appropriate and control all ways of expression: 
“(…) as soon as you bring something worthwhile out into the light men 
confiscate it… it’s mine, give it to me, you don’t understand anything, go 
and do your sewing, go play bridge, call your cousin on the phone… they 
keep what you find, they understand what it means and know how to 
explain it and explain things away till they lose their meaning…” (The 
Obscene…, 302) 
                                                 
87
 For the figurative sense, I can mention that Iris, the orphan, is expelled from La Casa accused of 
prostitution, even if the old women did not know anything about her actual habits to exhibit herself dancing 
for the young men of the neighbourhood or her naivety in believing that she was making love with 
Romualdo, who wore the cardboard head of El Gigante, when she was in reality being pimped by Mudito. I 
can also add the allusions to all the fat women of La Rinconada that who objectualized by Boy, who used 
them as sexual receptacles. In another meaning of bitch, I could bring up the case of Emperatriz who acted 
like the queen of a matriarchy, since the novel suggests that she is who that keeps order in La Rinconada 
and that she is the head of the relationship that she has with Dr. Azula.  
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In addition, it is implied that men (as part of the official systems of signification) by over-
interpreting signs also destroy their own force of expression, becoming stagnated. 
However, Inés and Peta find ways to build an alternative language that dissociates from 
the model and that makes Don Jerónimo state that he cannot understand what they say, as 
if they were speaking a different language; and when he does understand, he cannot 
believe what they say because their stories cannot be corroborated and are contradictory. 
Don Jerónimo does not understand them, even if they are using the same language, 
because he is trying to superimpose his contents onto the women’s new forms of 
expression that are escaping signification and organization. He is in a “chain that is still 
all too signifying” (Kafka…, 5).  
However, what really threatens Don Jerónimo’s sense of power, to the point of making 
him shudder, is the realization that such a worthless being, Peta, was able to create “three 
white handkerchiefs of the finest batiste, with hand-stitched borders and initials so 
exquisitely embroidered”. Peta, the representative of “the underside of life, the world of 
the left hand, of the reverse, of those things destined to perish in obscurity without ever 
knowing the light” (Donoso, The Obscene…, 148), does not have the right to create 
beauty. Peta, the insignificant old woman, the Third World zone, the oppressed, the 
witch, manages to join the game of the majoritarian culture to make its assemblage 
fissure from the inside. And, when the patriarchy of La Rinconada realizes, Peta has 
already gone somewhere else –in Inés or the yellow dog or etc. She gets ahead to meet a 
community that is expecting her: the collectivity of the old women of La Casa.  
In one of the versions of the plot, Inés stops being the wife (symbol of purity and beauty) 
of that powerful man in order to become one of the elderly women in La Casa, making 
him lose control over her (including the maternal role that tradition assigns her) and over 
La Casa and its people (social waste, anarchical mess). Inés and Peta both end up going 
to La Casa, where chaos reigns allowing the building to mutate (hallways appear and 
disappear, as well as walls, windows, doors, and patios) and to offer shelter to any type of 
discourse (the women create their own monstrous-like saints, Iris pretended to be 
pregnant, Inés fakes to be Misiá Raquel, etc.).   
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One may want to ask: did I not say that Inés and Peta are the same person? There is no 
easy answer: they are the same person, they are themselves, and, even more, they are any 
other old woman in La Casa. In El obscene, the old women do not have individual 
identities or individual voices –each voice is the voice of a collectivity. As a 
consequence, each of them is interchangeable, replaceable and unimportant as individual 
subjects, but not as members of the group, according to the argument of Deleuze and 
Guattari: “The most individual enunciation is a particular case of collective enunciation. 
[That is why it is useless to wonder who is X or Y or Z.] K will not be a subject but will 
be a general function that proliferates (…).” (Kafka…, 84). For this reason, one can 
observe that when they talk, the narrative voice shifts suddenly from one old woman to 
another:  
“Iris is chaste. No man has any claim to what she carries in her womb. No 
one must find out. No one must see her. Here in the cellar Mudito prepared 
for us –he’s such a good person, what would we have done without him?– 
we’re reaching total fulfillment as we iron and fold diapers for the child, 
knit shawls –lots of shawls so that the infant won’t have to be wrapped in 
just any old rag when the weather’s cold, it’s dangerous for babies to catch 
cold, although I hear that here are suppositories now that stop a runny nose 
in a couple of days, we must buy some– and attach yellow lace with silk 
ribbons to the hangings suspended from the brass-knobbed canopy… 
here’s the rubber sheet to keep the mattress from rotting with the child’s 
urine, rotted mattresses stink something awful and hardly any air at all gets 
into cellar, we’ll have to make bibs with the silk, it’s so pretty, so fine, 
blue silk because it’s going to be a boy… no, silk bibs are no good because 
you can’t hand-launder them, don’t you see, we’re not going to be sending 
them to the cleaner’s each time the baby messes, and babies mess a lot of 
bibs, several a day… but really, Amalia, silk’s washable, how can you be 
so stupid as not to even know that? Natural silk, the kind that’s really fine, 
has to be soaked well and aired out a little and them, afterwards, with an 
iron that’s not too hot…” (The Obscene…, 56). 
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In El obsceno not only all old women are the same, and for that reason they behave like a 
pack rather than a hierarchized society, but they are also witches and dogs which allows 
them to be erratic, to talk erratically, to be descentered, to talk descenteredly, to be 
contradictory, to talk contradictorily, to be asignificant, to talk asignificantly: “It doesn’t 
matter, Monsignor. At least grant me the privilege old women are entitled to, of saying 
things that don’t mean anything.” (Donoso, The Obscene…, 426). They are nomadic 
machines bringing out lines of escape from major discourses.  
This movement impedes the fixation of the text, i.e. its meanings cannot be fixed and set 
as something rigid, eternal and clear. The inclusion of aporias, contradictions and 
paradoxes works toward a staggering of the language in the novel, which makes evident 
the impossibility of reducing words to a determined meaning. It is impossible to grasp the 
significance of El obsceno and, for that, no critical interpretation can declare itself to be 
the best and the most accurate one. It may sound evident nowadays, but there was a long 
tradition of believing (and some would still defend it) that one could decipher the 
underlying, singular truth of a text –that which the author, the author-god, had chosen to 
teach.  
Donoso fights, as do Beckett and Sarduy, against the rigid constructions of reality that 
tend to reduce the expressivity of life, and that organize human knowledge, ranking the 
value of significance and setting a center that would give coherence to their structure. By 
building this hierarchized tree of meanings, all expression that is not included in the 
system sees itself automatically marginalized; all creativity and newness is blocked or 
reterritorialized within the system. In El obsceno, Donoso shows how social assemblages 
are inherently unnatural and, consequently, that they can be mutable, fissured, cracked, 




Chapter 3  
3 Dissolution of the self: the way of the becoming 
“The feminist dream of a common language, like all dreams for 
perfectly true language, of perfectly faithful naming of experience, is a 
totalizing and imperialist one. In that sense, dialectics too is a dream 
language, longing to resolve contradiction. Perhaps, ironically, we can 
learn from our fusions with animals and machines how not to be Man, 
the embodiment of Western logos.” 
Donna Haraway, “Cyborg Manifesto”. 
“Where now? Who now? When now?” are the opening words of The Unnamable. They 
are probably the same questions humankind has asked over and over: ‘who am I? where 
am I? what is the purpose of my life?’ Three dimensions are suggested here: space, 
perception, and time. Although one could keep adding more elements: laws, ruptures, 
transitions, emergences, collapses, encounters, … the list is endless, and humans do not 
have enough voice to utter all of them. As a result, to begin with, let us consider 
Beckett’s questions.  
Time, perception and space can be interrelated to help create concepts such as identity. 
To propose that this latter notion is fundamentally a social construction and how it, rather 
than helping to construct a broader understanding of Life, has been blocking its original 
flux, thereby contributing as a consequence to a diminution of its expressivity. Two 
beautiful literary examples support my main argument, The Unnamable and El obsceno: 
both of them show in very peculiar ways how any concept that human beings construct to 
explain reality (especially social ideas –especially identity (the self)) which is, after all, a 
human production. They elucidate the vulnerability of social assemblages by 
experimenting with alternative, or even contradictory, behaviours that divert from 
mainstream culture, giving voice to minoritarian expressions: in The Unnamable the 
voice is the sub-human and in El obsceno it is product of a class. The characters share an 
unceasing force of transformation and a tendency to go to the limits of humanness (the 
alter-human) in a process that can be considered as the dissolution of the self.  
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These two novels are examples of a minoritarian resistance to the imposition of law 
(petrified social constructions) over the creativity of life. They demonstrate that the social 
predicaments of their characters destabilize their identities and, for that, they start to 
question what the self is and what identity is. Deleuze and Guattari say that minor 
literature creates ways of escape from [of?] major discourses, opening spaces for 
transformation and newness and The Unnamable and El obsceno transgress social 
assemblages in many ways.  
The reader is infected and a trap is set up–that of using concepts to argue that concepts 
block production. The latter is a consequence of the former, since Beckett and Donoso 
are masters of playing with paradoxes and contradictions, as one can read in the closing 
words of The Unnamable: “It will be I? It will be the silence, where I am? I don’t know, 
I'll never know: in the silence you don’t know. You must go on. I can’t go on. I’ll go on.”  
 
3.1 Fixed I: the form of the individual, the law and the self 
Descartes’ famous proposition “I think, therefore I am” summarizes his central idea of 
human existence and reveals the fact that he directly related the self (the ‘ego’, for him) 
to a human capacity to think. That is to say, for Descartes the construction of the ego was 
essentially based on Cogito (I think). The question of who the I of his proposition is, 
arises right away. 
First, let us ask: if his proposition is T → E, then is -T → -E (I do not think, therefore I 
am not) also valid? The response to this question seems less intuitive, because one can 
ask if thinking has to be necessarily a conscious process (nowadays it is considered that 
thinking can occur at an unconscious level, as when one dreams). However, for Descartes 
it appears that the proposition “I think” is based on the ability to recognize self-
consciousness and that the I of “I think” is the place where this recognition condenses, as 
he says: “it is impossible that he should think without existing” (Descartes, 




Now, once one is conscious of himself he can assume that he is a person who exists 
somewhere. There is a group of inquires that follows: can one exist in a metaphysical 
world and, if so, can one think without a physical body? Possibly for Descartes there is 
One who can think without having to physically exist (God) (this would be T → –E). Can 
humankind be ‘not thinking’ and still exist (this would be –T → E)?  
Meanwhile, in the following paragraph I believe that he is actually changing the order of 
the connector therefore in his proposition “I think, therefore I am”, given that he places 
the certitude in the fact that one exists:  
“Thinking? At last I have discovered it - thought; this alone is inseparable 
from me. I am, I exist-that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I 
am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I 
should totally cease to exist. At present I am not admitting anything except 
what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that 
thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason (…). But 
for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind 
of a thing? As I have just said –a thinking thing.” (Descartes, 
Meditations…, 18) 
The use of the connector therefore seems unclear to me, especially because Descartes 
says that the second part of his proposition (“therefore I am”) cannot be taken as a logical 
inference88. Is he basically identifying human existence with thinking, T=E? Would that 
not deny the existence of humans who somehow cannot think? In this case, it seems that 
‘existence’ should be read as ‘consciousness of existence’ (rather than a physical 
existence as such), a faculty that he ascribes exclusively to humans89.  
                                                 
88
 “When someone says ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence from 
thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the 
mind” (Descartes, Meditations 68).  
89
 Given that the existence of nonhuman organisms does not need the inclusion of a faculty to think, he 
believes that those other entities can be merely seen as complicated machines (they do not act from 
knowledge) made by God. 
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To recapitulate, if “I think” is based on the ability to recognize self-consciousness and 
“therefore I am” is based on the consciousness of existence, could one reinterpret his 
proposition as ‘I am self-conscious, therefore I am conscious of my existence’?  
The Cartesian human being would then be an entity who possesses two fundamental 
skills: reason and a way to express that reason (with words).  
I = reason + language, 
and as language must give an account of that reason r, 
language = dr 
→ I = r + dr 
This definition is very restricted, since it presupposes an essence in human beings: the 
capacity to reason, from where all human behaviour can be explained. Such univocal 
characterization presents some issues: given that the state of the human body (the 
machine) is unimportant, how deteriorated can it be before its deterioration starts 
interfering with the expression of thoughts or the formulation of thoughts? Can words 
give a full account of thoughts? Does one have to express reason in a reasonable fashion?  
Overall, the Cartesian proposition “I think, therefore I am” is a scheme that universalizes 
the identification of a human being with a machine that reasons.  
Corollaries: 
 Perception. To define a human being as a creature that can reason is basically 
going to restrict all perception through the glass of rational thinking, leaving aside 
any other type of human expression.  
As a consequence, the law is going to take the form of reason.  
 Time. It needs to be stationary, like a frozen scene in which thoughts organize and 
create the connections among matter and the succession of actions.  
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 Space. It is going to be concentric and hierarchized. Everything is going to move 
around reason (the self), and the importance of phenomena is going to be related 
to their ability to agree with the law.  
Furthermore, it has to be homogeneous for the facts to be replicable. 
 Identity. It would take the form of the reproduction of sameness, which is that that 
is produced by the law – the process of mirroring the similar.  
 
Subsequently, a human being is an individual who only communicates on behalf of 
reason and whose only purpose of communication is reason. Any human behaviour that 
reason can explain is allowed and actions that cannot be domesticated through reason are 
marginalized or destroyed. Moreover, individuals do not have an ethical responsibility to 
those forms of life that do not benefit and serve their goals, or that simply do not affect 
them, and furthermore they can use those machines until exhaustion90.  
To summarize, humans are machines that think and reality matters as long as it can be 
passed through the filter of reason. 
 
                                                 
90
 I wonder what type of machine women are, since they ‘are not very reasonable’. And moreover, what 
type of machines the Mesoamericans were when the Spanish invaded their territory, since God had 
forgotten to give them a soul and logos? I believe that one of the most important points to discuss after the 
Cartesian definition of humans would be to know who decides what reason is and who are its 
representatives, who is invited to join them, how they can assure that the law is obeyed, et caetera.  
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3.2 Unfixed I: the form of the collectivity, the postulates and 
the becoming  
Characterizing humans as machines that think is not sufficient to account for all forms of 
human expression –besides the fact that it completely disregards forms of non-human 
expression. Whereas a mono-faceted human, whose essence is based in his capacity to 
think and whose mind is disembodied, cannot trust his senses to give account of the 
‘external world’, a multifaceted being would not only restrict his way to know the world 
through reason (representation) but would also include many other mechanisms that 
provide meaning through action (experience). The former is passive, contemplative, 
interpretative, and sees reality optically, striating space; the latter is active, engaged, able 
to feel events, and sees reality haptically, bringing events closer.  
This multidimensional human resembles Deleuze and Guattari’s proposition to see 
human beings as ‘human becomings’. This simple characterization opens a complex 
realm of interconnecting forces that altogether would help the continuous construction of 
humans. They defend this type of existence based on the intention to free humans of 
social constructions that narrow human creativity and try to channel human (and non-
human) expressivity. As opposed to the disembodied mind that, ironically, constitutes the 
essence of humans and that replicates its own law, they talk about humans who are 
formed by a mind (that is no longer considered the origin of all perceptions) and a body 
that is-there-to-experience. However, it is very important to note that they do not see 
humans as a dichotomical entity, since neither the body nor the mind can be defined as a 
unity and, more importantly, because what matters more is the large variety of relations 
that can be created between them and among other material entities (either organic or 
inorganic) in the universe that entail affects in multiple directions.  
Yet, one could question: how is it possible to produce a “large variety of relations” within 
a finite number of entities, or even within one single entity? It is more intuitive to see the 
first scenario than the second one. Though, if one considers an entity as something 
mutable, it becomes an easier task. Supposing that there are five human senses and that 
there is one event to be experienced with these five senses, and that each of these five 
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senses has only one way to encounter it, there would be a + b + c + d + e ways to 
experience this one event. If one wanted to consider the different ways in which each of 
these senses could appreciate an event, then there would be az + by + cw + dv + eu ways to 
experience it –assuming that one could tell in advance what these different ways z, y, w, 
v, v can be. And what if one added more than five senses and also experimented with 
new ways of experiencing with those senses (such as synesthesia)? Furthermore, one 
must think that, in a strict sense, no event can ever be repeated since all the actual 
conditions that create an incident cannot converge again and in the same way. Thoughts 
are framed through experience (but not restricted to it) and experience is altered through 
thoughts (but not restricted to it), nevertheless they are interconnected in order to produce 
a perception of reality.  
For Deleuze and Guattari, as thinking is a rhizomatic process that “(…) has no image, 
either to constitute a model of or to copy” (ATP, 377), there is no necessary 
(re)production of the law, or of any law. Unlike Cartesian thought, this type of thinking 
does not see itself pursuing a point of orientation that is a priori set (it does not start a 
voyage that aims to find itself) to manifest whatever it was looking for since the 
beginning. Nomadic thought explores, makes new connections, and imagines impossible 
worlds. Brian Massumi writes: “‘Nomad thought’ does not immure itself in the edifice of 
an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not repose on 
identity; it rides difference” (ATP, xii). However, as this is not a gratuitous process, one 
has to want to create this type of thought; one has to fight against the naturalization of 
tradition, habits, significations, in short, against all types of cultural assemblages that try 
hard to make the perception of reality an ossified interpretation, that wants to narrow the 
production of thought and that eventually can take the form of law.  
Another implication would be that there is not a sufficient system of representation that 
can give a total account of an event, since human experience involves a group of 
unsystematic processes that work on many levels and that are related to other entities. 
Such systems of representation, as social constructions, are unnatural; though they are 
useful to code communication among humans, and they allow quick and efficient ways to 
preserve knowledge; nonetheless, the risks start when such systems ‘forget’ that they are 
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mere interpretations of reality, becoming harmful repetitions and gluttony machines that 
want to colonize whatever does not agree and fit with them. Thus, there is verticalization 
of humans, the creation of “rocklike identities”, the replication of rules, uncritical 
thought, and the impoverishment of life. Social assemblages are helpful and unavoidable 
and there is nothing which essentially defines them as rejectable. Yet there is nothing that 
makes them indispensable either, since they all are artificial schemes. For that reason, 
when one talks about nomadic thought one also talks about postulates (instead of laws), 
given that they do not set themselves as the end-word, but as an idea and a way to 
perceive reality. Postulates are provisional and work locally, avoiding the establishment 
of universal truths and preventing centralization.  
Meanwhile, what is the body that perceives reality like? Before talking about a formed 
body, it is important to sketch its boundary: the Body without Organs (BwO). Deleuze 
and Guattari say that the BwO is a limit that “you are forever attaining” (ATP, 171). That 
is, one cannot become a BwO in reality but only try to approach it. It belongs to the 
virtual world and, for that, it does not contain formed matter or any forms of expression 
and content (that belong to the strata); it does not contain condensed matter and it 
encompasses all the probable actualizations of matter. A BwO still does not know about 
meanings, organizations, or structures. Rather, it is populated by flows of energy and 
forces (intensities). It is potentia.  
And yet, the human physical body is a thickened form of a BwO – a stratum, given that it 
is part of the actual world. However, it “is not reducible to an organism” (ATP, 366). 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, humans should attempt to get closer to that limit 
(BwO), since this practice (or set of practices) can fissure the systems of representation 
that want to be the law and that want to organize the functions of the body, telling it how 
to experience, what to expect, and where to direct desire. By fighting the suppression one 
could discover different possibilities of perception, expression and behaviour, whereby 




As a result, human perception of reality is scattered. That is, mind and thoughts are not 
the origin (or the end) of it, and humans cannot be defined as essentially something, 
given that they are becomings which are complexly interconnected to other becomings. 
Corollaries: 
 Perception. Meanings are constructed not only through ideas and words 
(concepts) but also through actions to a material experience of the body that has a 
capacity to affect reality and to be affected by it.91 Social constructions are 
unnatural and that human explanations of reality do not necessarily and 
sufficiently give a complete account of it.  
 Time. It is not the one of ideality or metaphysics, but the one of events in the 
plane of immanence. 
 Space. This is an open space where one can map intensities and flows, observing 
how they are indeed morphing space. Deleuze and Guattari call it “smooth space”. 
This nomad space is marked by trajectories, not by positions. It is amorphous, 
acentered, and directional (it cares about vectors of movement rather than 
coordinates of position). And, since it is open, it is the place for free action.  
 Identity. Given that there is not an essence for humankind, there is then not a 
fixed construction of the subject. Identity, as a construction of a law, is full of 
forms, categories, unities, similarities, etc. However, these systematizations fail to 
                                                 
91
 “The term ‘capacity’ is closely related to the term ‘affordance’ introduced by James Gibson within the 
context of a theory of ecological interactions. Gibson distinguishes between the intrinsic properties of 
things and their affordances. A piece of ground does have its own intrinsic properties determining, for 
example, how horizontal or slanted, how flat, concave or convex, and how rigid it is. But to be capable of 
affording support to a walking animal is not just another intrinsic property, it is a capacity which may not 
be exercised if there are no animals around. Given that capacities are relational in this sense, what an 
individual affords another may depend on factors like their relative spatial scales: the surface of a pond or 
lake may not afford a large animal a walking medium, but it does to a small insect which can walk on it 
because it is not heavy enough to break through the surface tension of the water. Affordances are also 
symmetric, that is, they involve both capacities to affect and be affected” (De Landa, 63). 
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grasp the wide range of productivity of life (which is, according to the law, the 
different). 
Furthermore, since the flow of life is always in movement, nothing can ever be the same. 
The self is a becoming. The nomadic-self does not want to possess, to imprint, to stop, to 
catch, to kill…. It wants to become the flow or perhaps a channel where the flow crosses. 
And for that, there is no place for an identity.  
In this case, the ethical responsibility of humans is to contribute to the production of life 
by resisting social constructions (identity, social systems, social institutions, etc.) that 
want to block and systematize desire92. Even if a “highly stratified semiotic is difficult to 
get away from”, one has to try to destroy the “dominant atmospheric semiotic” in order to 
attain freedom. Maybe the way to break the constraints of fixed self-images is 
experimentation, the aim to not signify and interpret (ATP, 138 – 139). 
 
3.3 Dissolving the self: towards an unfixed I in The 
Unnamable and El obscene pájaro de la noche 
Considering the self as the expression of identity, unity and separation from others, the 
dissolution of the self is a process that aims to break the boundaries that isolate subjects. 
The confinement of the subject into a self leads to a restricted way of perceiving reality, 
communicating with others and escaping from the chains of social institutions – that 
actually want to reinforce the self since it is through it that they can control individuals. 
In order to configure an identity, one has to classify, organize and identify human 
                                                 
92 Desire is a force that should not be equaled to sexual desire; it is an energy that is not exclusive of 
humans but, instead, has to do with the impulse of life to create connections and produce multiplicities. For 
this reason, it does not come after the existence of a person. Desire is production, immanence and 
presentation. As a process of creation, it should not be understood as a search for something lacking; when 
desire is directed, one should instead talk about neurosis, “a desire that is already submissive and 
searching to communicate its own submission” (Deleuze, Kafka 10). 
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attributes, processes that imply a sense of separation and discrimination. Constructing a 
self is a narrowing of the subject; it is a process that gives the subject a mirrored image of 
itself, that is, it makes it static.  
On the contrary, a dissolved-self works against the exclusion and classification of others 
who do not resemble one’s identity, given that it is open to the different and for that it can 
reduce the separation from the other and build a collectivity that resists the imposition of 
the same. Institutions of power want to preserve the identical and identities help to 
reproduce power so that it is easier to impose the law and homogenize behaviour. They 
provide encouragements to “Always obey. The more you obey, the more you will be 
master, for you will only be obeying (…) yourself.” (ATP, 376) Meanwhile, a dissolved-
self not only creates connections with others and builds new ways to interrelate among 
other people, it also contributes to a broader perception of reality, since it does not 
necessitate unity and sameness. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari defend the destruction 
of the self, given that it is a being (fixed), not a becoming (unfixed), and, for that, it 
blocks production, creativity, and desire. By dismantling the self, one “break[s] the holds 
of power” and a different  
“form of politics becomes possible, where singularity and collectivity are 
no longer at odds with each other, and where collective expressions of 
desire are possible. Such a politics does not seek to regiment individuals 
according to a totalitarian system of norms, but to de-normalize and de-
individualize through a multiplicity of new, collective arrangements 
against power.” (AO, xxi)  
By dissolving the self and considering it a becoming, one may access a reality that is not 
idealized through the fiction of the law (which attempts to ossify the creativity of life in 
order to preserve itself), and that does not only defend the interests of majoritarian 
assemblages.  
In order to dissolve one’s self, one must find ways to escape these majoritarian discourses 
which replace one’s own power with their power, by becoming-something-else: 
becoming a molecular body, becoming a dog, becoming a woman, becoming a bug, etc. 
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In short, becoming other means to grasp the different and include diverse ways to 
perceive and experience reality; it means “to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, 
insubstantial” (Haraway, 313); it means to fight centrality, purism, cleanness and defend 
illegitimate expressions of life; it means to always morph. However, one has to be very 
careful to not trap oneself in dead-ends, for that becoming “is a question of finding an 
escape (an escape, and not ‘liberty’)” (Kafka 13), since finding liberty means that one 
needs to stop within it; that is, liberty becomes the goal. The same way that becoming-a-
dog does not mean to be a dog, escaping does not mean reaching an end point (whether it 
is liberty or not), for that would be the negation of the transformation. One last note on 
this subject: becoming not-human does not mean becoming inhuman. The former defends 
those expressions of life that are not-human as much that it defends the ones who are 
human (especially the minoritarian ones); it defends the creativity of life as a broad realm 
of production that is not restricted to humankind.  
In becoming not-human, the role of literature is to open spaces for transformations and 
transgressions. Since literature works with fiction and fiction does not have to be 
restricted to human ways of perceiving life, it can imagine anything – ‘actualizing’ forms 
of matter that did not condense in the ‘actual’ world (what one would call “impossible 
forms of matter”): absurd93 combinations, prohibited fusions, contaminated forms, 
aberrant coincidences, alogical events,94 etc.  
Literature fights majoritarian discourses by exploring (and revealing) ways of perceiving 
reality that are marginalized, blocked or censored. It can expose, for instance, that there is 
no need to overvalue the perception of reality through thinking, since believing that 
mind-perception is more accurate than other modes is merely a thought (an image). It can 
explore reality from the perspective of an animal, a machine, a rock, a cloud, a piece of 
food, a part of the body, etc., and for this reason it helps to avoid considering oneself as a 
                                                 
93
 “(…) that which is without signification or that which may be neither true nor false”. (LOS, 15) 
94
 “Not following a logical order, but following alogical consistencies or compatibilities.” (ATP, 250). 
Alogical means what is neither illogical nor logical, but beyond it.  
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rigid, complete and perfect entity. In this respect, literature can disassemble petrified 
truths and crack systems of signification in order to produce sense.  
 
3.3.1 Becoming-unnamable 
In The Unnamable one cannot be sure of the certainty of the events because the 
protagonist, on the one hand, denies the reliability of his memory and, on the other hand, 
does not let the reader know if he has moved to the future (where he planned/wished to 
be) or if he is only talking about hypothetical scenarios: 
“I add this, to be on the safe side: these things I say (and shall say, if I can) 
are no longer, or are not yet, or never were, or never will be - or (if they 
were, if they are, if they will be) were not here, are not here, will not be 
here, but elsewhere. But I am here. So I am obliged to add this: I who am 
here, who cannot speak, cannot think, and who must speak (and therefore 
perhaps think a little), cannot in relation only to me who am here, to here 
where I am; but can a little, sufficiently (I don’t know how, unimportant), 
in relation to me who was elsewhere (who shall be elsewhere) and to those 
places where I was (where I shall be). But I have never been elsewhere 
(however uncertain the future). And the simplest therefore is to say that 
what I say (what I shall say, if I can) relates to the place where I am, to me 
who am there (in spite of my inability to think of these, or to speak of 
them), because of the compulsion I am under to speak of them (and 
therefore perhaps think of them a little). Another thing: what I say (what I 
may say) on this subject (the subject of me and my abode) has already 
been said - since, having always been here, I am here still. (At last a piece 
of reasoning that pleases me, and worthy of my situation!) So I have no 
cause for anxiety.” (The Unnamable, 11-12) 
It is especially the uncertainty of the past that brings up the problem of a ‘bad’ memory. 
There is a distinction between forgetting on purpose and forgetting accidentally, since the 
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former refers to an active process and the latter to a passive spectacle. And even if both 
result in oblivion, it matters how one arrived there: forgetting on purpose is active, a 
desire to undo memory and to unleash mementos in order to provide ourselves with a 
sense of newness and openness (‘I can not remember’); in contrast, accidental 
forgetfulness is an accidental condition that leads to confusion (‘I cannot remember’). 
The unnamable says:  
“I never understood a word of it in any case - not a word of the stories it 
spews, like gobbets in a vomit. My inability to absorb, my genius for 
forgetting, are more than they reckoned with. Dear incomprehension, it’s 
thanks to you I’ll be myself in the end. Nothing will remain of all the lies 
they have glutted me with.” (Beckett, The Unnamable, 29-30) 
His “genius for forgetting” gives him the ability to get out of subjectivization and 
individualization. He avoids getting caught in the organization of the law so that he can 
become an open self (a collectivity)95. In summary, the unnamable can remember, but 
decides to forget – instead of not being able to remember – and, in this effort, to forget he 
also decants in the present moment, building a type of “short-term memory”. 
This is why Beckett does not talk about identity. The protagonist in The Unnamable, as 
most of those in his trilogy, hardly knows who he is; he cannot build a self, given that he 
only has “short-term memory”, which keeps him in the motion of continuing to 
experience, to create new meanings and to keep being new. In other words, one cannot 
talk about a he/she/it/we/etc. because everything is part of the endless movement: one 
transverses the other, diluting the limit between this or that and becoming this and that (a 
multiplicity96). The self loses its boundaries and, consequently, its beginning and its end. 
                                                 
95
 “[The dispersion of the organs] has nothing to do with a lack, and constitutes their mode of presence in 
the multiplicity they form without unification or totalization. With every structure dislodged, every memory 
abolished, every organism set aside, every link undone, they function as raw partial objects, dispersed 
working parts of a machine that is itself dispersed” (AO, 324). 
96
 “(…) packs, or multiplicities, continually transform themselves into each other, cross over into each 
other. (…)  becoming and multiplicity are the same thing. A multiplicity is defined not by its elements, nor 
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There is no way to establish a center. In Chapter 1 it was mentioned that the unnamable 
becomes a limit, a BwO, as in The Unnamable: “(…) I’m in the middle. I’m the partition. 
I’ve two surfaces and no thickness. Perhaps that’s what I feel: myself vibrating.” (134). 
One should also remember that Deleuze and Guattari say in A Thousand Plateaus that 
“the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities.” (249), 
which summarizes the idea of considering the self as becoming that does not belong 
either to the molar nor to the molecular assemblages. The self has to be in perpetual 
motion (vibrating?) and for that it goes “beyond any opposition between the one and the 
multiple.” (ATP, 154). 
The unnamable is unnamable not because he does not have a name, but because it is not 
important to have one. Names are for pinning things down, for fixing them, for separating 
them; names identify things, they give identity. To be “the unnamable” provides him with 
the ability to detach himself from his relatives, from his origin, from his motherland, 
from his expectations, … in short, from his identity.  
In this line of thought, even if the narrator narrates in first person, his discourse is 
actually all in indirect style, since he seems to be saying constantly what somebody else 
tells him to say. The narrator does not disappear, but rather he becomes a multiplicity of 
voices. If one observes redundancy in the narrations it is only apparent since each 
instance of repetition is really a difference: one is hearing a different voice every time – a 
voice that is connected to many voices; a nomadic voice that talks for everybody. The 
unnamable becomes that voice: a voice that does not belong to anybody as much as it 
belongs to all, because it is going to a place of indetermination where language is a 
bustling force (molecular language) that avoids serfdom. In this sense, when one reads in 
the novel “I say” it can be read as “he says” or as “we say” (as the narrator sustains that 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
by a center of unification or comprehension. It is defined by the number of dimensions it has; it is not 
divisible, it cannot lose or gain a dimension without changing its nature” (ATP, 249). 
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he could be other(s): “I shall not say ‘I’ again, ever again, it’s too farcical. I shall put in 
its place, whenever I hear it, the third person (if I think of it)” (The Unnamable, 55). 
Throughout The Unnamable the personal pronoun “I” is only used as a necessity of 
language to refer to a grammatical subject that performs the actions, but one must 
consider it as a gudgeon that momentarily gives a support-point to keep on going with the 
speech. One should almost forget that a personal pronoun was utilized and turn our 
attention to the verb, to the flow of the speech. That is why I is not I, necessarily (and it 
does not matter). What matters is action.  
Words are loose their semantic value – they become light and inapprehensible, adding an 
evident fracture at the syntactic level of the phrases and sentences (which resembles 
schizophrenic speech). To recapitulate, one faces a type of discourse that diminishes the 
importance of the semantics and that disturbs syntaxes so that the referential function of 
language is lessened. That is also why the protagonist can become incoherent and outside 
moral judgments. This sense of detachment is a common characteristic in Beckett’s 
writings and it shows a feeling of general absurdity. Once again, he shows the 
incoherence of language to step further away from its “normal” functions, creating a 
fissure (a line of flight) that frees it.  
There is close relation between the dissolution of language and the self of the protagonist 
in The Unnamable: both go towards a displacement of any possible center, hierarchy and 
hegemony, which implies that heterogeneities, differences, and horizontalization are 
going to be welcomed and celebrated. A self in constant deterritorialization is open to 
many becomings; it is open to believe in any ideology as much as any other (or in none); 
and it is open to prefer one name as much as any other (or none); etc. As long as this 
decentering continues, it is assured that these characteristics are provisional so that, 
among other consequences, the exterior/interior can be fused: this is the case for the 
unnamable, and this is exactly why one cannot talk about exile, expulsion, or a will for 
redemption.  
The unnamable is voluntarily dissolving his self and this dissolution (as it appears too in 
the texts of the trilogy, and especially in How it is) conduces him to a fragile, slow, and 
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maybe painful dissolution of his ‘humanness’. One may want to ask: what happens after 
he dissolves his self? There is no after the dissolution since the becoming does not have 
an end, which means that he is always approaching the BwO because every time that the 
jar, his family, or his name want to pull him back to an identity, to a condensed self, he 
fights back by becoming Mahood, or Molloy, or a pole that holds the menu in front of a 
slaughterhouse. Above all, he becomes a type of language that, as water in the river, a 
hand cannot stop. Language would fail if it were pinned down to its functions or reduced 
to its uses. Beckett has managed to take it beyond signification.   
Is Beckett showing how words fail when trying to communicate, or is he revealing that 
words can do more than only communicate? In his work, the narrative voice abandons the 
characters in order to indicate that words can say much more than they say: they say what 
they say, what they do not say, what they could have said, and/or what they will say. 
Paradoxically, this retreat becomes an approach. Beckett teaches that I/you/she/we 
will/would/should desire more/not much/less/always/together.  
 
3.3.2 Becoming-Mudito 
In El obscene pájaro most of the characters do not have individuality, which is a self-
identical configuration. They occupy one another: Inés/Peta, Inés/Iris, 
Jerónimo/Humberto, Humberto/Mudito, etc. This is most notable with the protagonist, 
since he seems to circulate through a great number of characters and objects: Humberto 
Peñaloza; Mudito, a caretaker in la Casa de Ejercicios Espirituales de la Encarnación de 
la Chimba; a monster in La Rinconada; an elderly woman; a street ‘dog’; a cardboard 
head; a baby; a homeless man; a stain on the wall; a sewed sack; etc. He is the “the 
Deterritorialized par excellence” (ATP, 381) since he is not reterritorialized after any of 




The anticipated total dissolution or becoming molecular of Mudito is shown in the final 
lines of El obsceno when one of the elder women throws the contents of her sack, 
including him, into the fire: 
“The old woman stands up, she grabs the sack and, opening it, shakes it 
out over the fire, emptying it into the flames: kindling wood, cardboard, 
stockings, rags, newspapers, writing paper, trash, it doesn’t matter what as 
long as the flame picks up a bit to fight off the cold, who cares about the 
smell of something being singed, of rags that don’t burn easily, of paper”. 
(Donoso, The Obscene…, 438) 
The implication is that Mudito did not exist anymore when ‘he’ was thrown into the fire, 
because, after the fire burned out, there was nothing left but a “black smudge”.97 That is, 
it seems that Mudito became molecular either while the old woman was carrying him on 
her way to the park or while he was burning in the fire.   
It is important to note that when nomadic-Mudito occupies a character or object, the 
occupations reveal a new approach to the form he takes, deterritorializing every taken 
position. For instance, when he is the scrivener, he apparently never writes; when he 
becomes a baby, he tries to rape Inés; when he makes love with the witch, he is disgusted, 
not in love; and when he is Mudito he is neither mute nor deaf, but he pretends to be 
both. He is like a virus that contaminates the entities which he encounters, mutating when 
moving to a new character or object; i.e. by coming into contact with them, Mudito 
contributes to the production of a sense (the Mudito effect98).  
                                                 
97
 Furthermore, the very existence of Mudito/Humberto Peñaloza is called into question, maybe because he 
is not a formed thing but a force. Emperatriz says: “It is as if Humberto had never existed. Sometimes I 
think…, yes, I think that I invented him.” / “Es como si [Humberto] jamás hubiera existido. A veces 
pienso…, sí, pienso que yo lo inventé a él” (El obsceno 360). I translate this fragment, which was omitted 
in the English version.  
98
 “The discovery of sense as an incorporeal effect, being always produced by the circulation of the 
element = x in the series of terms which it traverses, must be named the ‘Chryssipus effect’ or the ‘Carroll 
effect’” (LOS, 70). 
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Some of the two more remarkable positions of Mudito are the papier-mâché head and the 
seventh old woman, given that they are thresholds to a literal becoming-collective. The 
big cardboard head is one of the manners in which Mudito occupies the self of the men 
who use it, or, in other words, he becomes the head and, therefore, every man who has 
fornicated with Iris. Even further, by using the big head he assures the dissolution of all 
the other selves that he used to embody: 
“You put it [the Giant’s head] over me, as if going through a ritual (…) 
eradicating with this investiture each of my previous existences, every one 
of them: Mudito; Don Jerónimo’s secretary; Iris’s dog; Humberto 
Peñaloza, the sensitive prose writer (…). All of us dissolved in the 
darkness inside the mask.” (The Obscene, 67) 
This is a multiplication of Mudito’s self, given that this papier-mâché head does not have 
a name, a function in society, nor a sense of belonging to an institution (either family, 
friendship or any other for which one sees the need for possessive adjectives –and 
pronouns– and/or hierarchies within the group). This fact implies that whoever puts on 
the head transforms himself into an anonymous part of the nomadic-self assuring the 
disappearance of individualities and becoming part of the collective subject. That is why 
when the men in the magazine shop destroy the head, Mudito is very disturbed: they were 
not only destroying a mask, but also Mudito’s threshold to a multitude of selves: 
“Iris throws herself on the floor and puts her arms around me. The dust on 
the floor makes my eyes itch. Andrés grabs me, starts beating me as if I 
were a drum, while the other three Aces and Tito improvise a dance… tum-
tum-tum-tum… as if their pummeling palms didn’t hurt me… tum-tum-
tum… they pick Iris off the floor… tum-tum…come on, come on, Gina, 
shake it, more, more, once more around… and Romualdo breaks up our 
group, charging at Andrés who drops me.” (The Obscene, 85) 
It is important to note that, in this fragment, the narrator uses the first person singular 
voice because the cardboard head is narrating the occurrences, implying that Mudito has 
become the head.  
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Meanwhile, when Mudito embodies the seventh old woman99, he accesses the collective 
subject of the old women who live in a pack. They are never alone, they are always in 
groups of two or more: “(…) we want to be as close to one another as possible (…) we’re 
together and toward evening can go to the chapel in groups (…), we can cling to one 
another’s rags (…)” (Donoso, The Obscene…, 14) That is to say, by becoming the 
seventh old woman100 he becomes any of the old women because they do not have 
individuality – in many parts of the plot one can observe how the old women are 
interchangeable. Another characteristic of these women is that they personify a 
minoritarian resistance, since in El obsceno they are described as the group that threatens 
the consistency and power of the majoritarian discourses in the novel: Don Jerónimo and 
his order in La Rinconada; the bishop and his order in La Casa; the working class and 
their order in the streets; etc.   
These pre-individual women have learned to undo themselves which “is proper to the war 
machine: the ‘not-doing’ of the warrior, the undoing of the subject.” (ATP, 400) Their 
resistance is based on their capacity to avoid being controlled: they are meaningless, 
useless and incoherent (as much as their speech, whose authority is based on the “they 
say” of the popular anonymous voice), which gives them the means to escape from the 
authority and power of the dominant class. The old women become a fissure – a line of 
flight – which fractures the force of the majoritarian assemblages in El Obsceno and that 
introduces elements of disorder to it, given that, as one of the old females say, “old 
women have powers and prerogatives (…) an anarchy in which everything’s allowed, no 
obligations to fulfill because nobody cares whether they fulfill them or not” (The 
Obscene, 322). 
                                                 
99
 “(…) the old women –the seven of us, now that they’ve stripped me of my sex and taken me into their 
number– are looking after his [Don Jerónimo’s] son in Iris’s womb” (The Obscene 50). 
100
 Mudito did not choose to embody a woman that could be the representative of standards within the 
powerful class; rather, he decided to pass through the marginalized women, namely the ones in the 
periphery: “But there is another route (…) that does not pass through Woman (…). It passes through 
women and other (…) illegitimate [minorities]” (Haraway 313). 
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In the last chapter of the novel, for instance, in a very comic episode, the old woman and 
the orphans are picked up by Father Azócar and four elegant priests who want to turn the 
event into a memorable moment by giving a speech, reciting one by one the names of the 
woman, and convincing the women not to bring useless packages since they will be given 
all new things in the house that is awaiting them in the high part of town. However, the 
elderly women, a chaotic force, destroy their vain attempts by talking about unimportant 
and unrelated things and by continuing to collect unnecessary effects to bring with them, 
to the point that Father Azócar gives up and asks the priests to just take a bunch of them 
and put them in the buses. Father Azócar reflects:   
“Incredible! No wonder Mother Benita’s been dying to get out of this hell. 
Better not explain anything to them. Let them go on believing whatever 
they wanted to believe, because reason and unreason, causes and effects, 
weren’t real for these anarchic creatures.” (The Obscene, 427) 
Mudito, in order to dismantle his self and to separate from the white-Western-
heterosexual-Man, becomes woman.101 He gains the power to detach from the 
organization of his body and from his social functions, since the old women of La Casa 
do not have sex, rank, or utility. 
                                                 
101
 “Although all becomings are already molecular, including becoming-woman, it must be said that all 





“‘Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were 
their salvation?’ (…) after centuries of exploitation, why do people still 
tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that 
they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for 
themselves?” 
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. 
As part of the social imaginary, identity is a way to hold power over others since it is a 
mode of controlling and systematizing their characteristics, their actions and their 
expressions. Given that identity does not have any type of fundamental relation to the 
definition of humans, it is based on a sense of inclusion and exclusion, as well as on the 
intention of keeping things static. It is within this context that the construction of a self is 
crucial, as well as the reinforcement and repetition of the rules that naturalize their own 
existence and that justify the neutralization of the different.   
The novels discussed throughout this thesis, Cobra, The Unnamable and El obsceno 
pájaro de la noche, show that identity, as a simple social construction, can be rethought 
and redefined. They deterritorialize human identity by evincing different ways of 
behaving and different ways of understanding the self, or even by showing that there is 
no necessity to hold subjects to such a construction.  
Sarduy’s Cobra challenges the idea of the normal and the normative – presenting 
grotesque situations that do not follow common logic (the logic of the ‘good sense’) and 
that crack the forced link made between subjects and social functions or behaviours. 
Meanwhile, Beckett’s The Unnamable adds that the boundaries of humanity and the 
functions of the human body can be broad, showing that there are insufficient 
characteristics to define a human, that is, demonstrating that there is nothing that 
essentially can define humankind. Lastly, Donoso’s El obsceno extends an invitation to 
imagine humans as something-else, as entities outside their human limits.  
Whereas Cobra, The Unnamable and El obsceno fight the solidified and constraining 
idea of the ‘self’, showing that by, dissolving it, subjects can actually enhance their 
understanding of life and of the Other, they do not impose a new way to categorize it. 
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They present the artifices behind the construction of the self, but they do not 
reterritorialize it, which would contradict the very spirit of their questionings.  
While identity (whose basis is found in a self-mirroring image) isolates, classifies and 
hierarchizes human beings, the process of dissolving the self does not lead to the 
conclusion of considering subjects as void and nihilistic entities. Rather, it opens the 
ways in which they can perceive reality and it helps to expand the inclusion of diverse 
ways to express those understandings, since the human without ‘self’ is not pushed to 
exclude the not-normal and not-same.  
In this respect, literature can be a way to escape from the imposition of law, whether 
related to the construction of homogenized social behaviours or related to the obligation 
to follow grammatical rules, since literature does not necessitate replicating, copying or 
simulating social constructions. For this reason, literature can introduce novelty not only 
within language but also in ways of perceiving reality – fiction does not even need to be 
constrained to the actual world – and in ways of relating to reality. In contrast to a 
withered and institutionalized use of language, Beckett pushes it to a limit, Sarduy makes 
a sensual experience of it and Donoso decentralizes it, contributing to the opening of its 
creativity.  
By doing so, they also fight a social battle: that of helping to disassemble social 
institutions that rarefy human creativity, human perceptions and human connections. 
They encourage readers to stop conceiving of human activities as static goal-directed-
ends, as this would destroy desire, emergence, production, creativity, novelty, and 
reinforce the institution of major discourses.  
Perhaps as a way to resist majoritarian discourses one should disobey the law of the 
‘grammatically correct’ as these writers have, and disobey the law of the ‘socially 
correct’ as do their characters, exploring the margins of reality that are more 
heterogeneous. The dissolution of the self, therefore, becomes a way out of human 
domestication through generations of myths: “(…) like a caged beast born of caged 
beasts born of caged beasts born of caged beasts born in a cage and dead in a cage, born 




Adorno, Theodor W. “Notes on Beckett” in Journal of Beckett Studies 19.2. Edinburgh: 
University Press. UK, 2010. 157–178. 
-------- “Trying to Understand Endgame” in Notes to Literature II. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. 
Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen. New York: Columbia University Press,1992. 
241-280 
Ardoin, Paul. “Deleuze’s Monstrous Beckett: Movement and Paralysis” in Journal of 
Modern Literature. Volume 38, Number 2. Florida State University. USA, 2015. 
Pp. 134-149. Electronic version. 
Arteaga, Andrés. “El cuerpo travesti como urdidumbre neobarroca y como desecho en la 
novela Cobra (1972) de Severo Sarduy” en Affectio Societatis Nº 9. 
Departamento de Psicoanálisis. Universidad de Antioquia. Colombia, diciembre, 
2008. Versión electrónica.  
Astruc, Rémi. “The Circus of Being a Man” in Shofar: An interdisciplinary Journal of 
Jewish Studies, Volume 19, Number 1. USA, Fall 2000. Pp. 109-116. Electronic 
version. 
-------- “Roth, Ethics and the Carnival” in Philip Roth Studies, Volume 9, Number 1. 
USA, Spring 2013. Pp. 65-74. Electronic version. 
Baker, Robert. “José Donoso’s El obsceno pájaro de la noche: Thoughts on 
‘Schizophrenic’ Form” in Revista de estudios hispánicos. Jan., 1992; Periodicals 
Archive Online. Pp. 37.  
Bakhtin, Makhail. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Hélène Iswolsky. Indiana University 
Press. Bloomington and Indianapolis. USA, 1984. Print version.  
Barthes, Roland. The Pleasure of the Text. Trans. Richard Miller. Hill and Wang. A 
division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux. USA, 1975. Electronic version. 
-------- “The Rustle of Language”, “Writing the Event”, and “The Image” in The Rustle 
of Language. University of California Press. USA, 1989. Pp. 76- 82, 149-156 and 
350-358. Electronic Version. 
Baudelaire, Charles. “On the Essence of Laughter” in The Mirror of Art. Trans. Jonathan 
Mayne. Phaidon Press. London, Great Britain, 1955. Pp. 131 – 153. Print version.  
Beckett, Samuel. Waiting for Godot. A Tragicomedy in Two Acts. New York: Grove 
Press, 1954. Print version. 
-------- Molloy. Grove Press. Grove Weidenfeld. USA, 1955. Print Version.  
-------- Malone dies. Grove Press. USA, 1956. Electronic version. 
-------- The Unnamable. Grove Press. Collected Works, 14. New York, USA, 1970. Print 
version.  
-------- How it is. Grove Press. Collected Works, 5. New York, USA, 1970. Print version. 
 81 
 
-------- Not I. Faber & Faber. London, Great Britain, 1973. [This version does not have 
page numeration.] Print version. 
Bloom, Harold. The Grotesque. Bloom´s Literary Themes. USA: Yale University Press, 
2009. Electronic version.  
Carriedo López, Lourdes, “Pervivencia y renovación de lo grotesco en la narrativa del 
siglo XX” en Cédille, revista de estudios franceses. No. 7. España, Abril de 2011. 
Versión electrónica.  
De Landa, Manuel. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. Transversals, New 
Directions in Philosophy. Series Editor. USA: Keith Ansell Pearson, University of 
Warwick. Continuum, 2012. Electronic version. 
De Vito, Joseph. “Nonverbal messages” in Human Communication. The Basic Course, 
9/E. USA: Pearson, 2002. 134-157. Electronic version. 
Deleuze, Gilles. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. USA: 
Columbia University Press, 1990. Print version.  
-------- “He stuttered” and “The Exhausted” in Essay Critical and Clinical. Tans. Daniel 
W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. London, Great Britain: Verso, 1998. 107-113 / 
196-197 (Notes) and 152-174 / 202-206 (Notes). Electronic version. 
Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix. Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. London, 
Great Britain: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. Electronic version. 
-------- Kafka, Toward a Minor Literature. Trans. Dana Polan. Theory and History of 
Literature, Volume30. London, Great Britain: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986. Electronic version. 
-------- A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. London, Great Britain: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Electronic version.  
Descartes, René. A Discourse on The Method. Trans. Ian Maclean. USA: Oxford 
University Press. Oxford World’s Classics, 2006. Electronic version. 
-------- Meditations on First Philosophy. Trans. John Cottingham. Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Philosophy. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Electronic 
version. 
Donoso, José. El obsceno pájaro de la noche. España: Argos Vergara, 1979. Versión 
impresa. 
-------- The Obscene Bird of Night. Trans. Hardie St. Martin and Leonard Mades. New 
York, USA: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. Print version.  
-------- El lugar sin límites. 4a edición. España: Bruguera, 1984. Versión electrónica. 
Encyclopædia Britannica online in www.britannica.com 
Esslin, Martin (Editor). Samuel Beckett, a Collection of Critical Essays. USA: Prentice-
Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Twentieth Century Views, 1965. Print version.  
Finnegan, Pamela May. “Introduction” and “Linguistic Monsters or Linguistic 
Possibility?” in The Tension of Paradox. José Donoso’s The Obscene Bird of the 
 82 
 
night as Spiritual Exercises. USA: Ohio University. Monographs in International 
Studies. Latin America Series, No. 18., 1992. 127-147. Print version. 
González Echevarría, Roberto. “Plain Song: Sarduy’s ‘Cobra’” in Contemporary 
Literature, Vol. 28, No. 4, After the Boom: Recent Latin American. University of 
Wisconsin Press. Winter. USA, 1987. Pp. 437-459. Electronic version. 
Gutiérrez-Mouat, Ricardo. “La factura de una novela: El obsceno pájaro de la noche, de 
José Donoso” en Anales de Literatura Chilena. Año 11, Junio 2010, Número 13. 
Chile. 151 – 162. Versión electrónica. 
Haraway, Donna. “Cyborg Manifesto. Science, Technology and Socialist-feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century” in The Cyberculture Reader. Edited by David Bell and 
Barbara M. Kennedy. London, GB: Routledge, 2000. 292 – 324. Electronic 
version. 
Harpham, Geoffrey. “The Grotesque: First Principles” in The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, Vol. 34, No. 4. USA, Summer, 1976. 461-468. Electronic version.  
Kayser, Wolfgang. The grotesque in Art and Literature. USA: Indiana University Press, 
1963. Print version.  
-------- Interpretación y análisis de la obra literaria. 4ª ed. España: Gredos. Biblioteca 
Románica Hispánica. Tratados y monografías, 3, 1976. Versión impresa. 
Leitch, Vincent B. (General Editor) The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. 
USA: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2001. Electronic version. 
Magnarelli, Sharon. “Amidst the Illusory Depths: The First Person Pronoun and El 
Obsceno Pájaro de la Noche” en MLN, Vol. 93, No. 2, Hispanic Issue. The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. USA, Mar., 1978. Pp. 267-284. Electronic version. 
Molina, Mauricio. “Más allá del Boom Severo Sarduy” en Revista de la Universidad de 
México. No. 53. UNAM. México, 2008. Versión electrónica. 
Mora; Ortega; Barthes; et al. Severo Sarduy. España: Fundamentos. Col. Espiral. Serie 
Figuras, No. 16, 1976. Versión impresa. 
Musgrave, David. “The Abstract Grotesque in Beckett’s ‘Trilogy’” in Samuel Beckett 
Today / Aujourd’hui, Vol. 14, After Beckett / D’après Beckett. USA, 2004. Pp. 
371-385. Electronic version. 
Parr, Adrian (Editor). The Deleuze Dictionary. Revised Edition. Great Britain: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005. Electronic version.  
Polák. Petr. “El arte grotesco a través de los siglos”. Digital Library of the Faculty of 
Arts, Masaryk University. República Checa, 2011. Pp. 39-64. Versión electrónica. 
Sarduy, Severo. Cobra. España: Editorial Sudamericana. Argentina, 1986. Versión 
impresa. 
-------- Maitreya. España: Seix Barral / Nueva Narrativa Hispánica, 1982. 
Schoennenbeck G., Sebastián. “La bruja y la ruptura de un orden en El Obsceno Pájaro 
de la Noche de José Donoso.” en Anales de Literatura Chilena. Año 10, Junio 
 83 
 
2009, Número 11. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. 161-175. Versión 
impresa. 
Sultan, Sabbar Saadoon. “The Critical Aspects of Becket’s ‘Trilogy’” in Samuel Beckett 
Today / Aujourd’hui, Vol. 14, After Beckett / D’après Beckett. USA, 2004. 421-
435. Electronic version. 
Thomson, Philip. The Grotesque. Great Britain: The Critical Idiom. Methuen & Co. Ldt., 
24, 1972. Print version.  
Valdés, Adriana. “Narrador sin límites. Notas sobre El Obsceno Pájaro de la Noche, de 
José Donoso” en Revista Universum, No. 11. Universidad de Talca. Chile, 1996. 
218 – 222. Versión electrónica.  
Weller, Shane. “Adorno’s Notes on The Unnamable” in Journal of Beckett Studies 19.2. 
UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2010. 179–195. Electronic version. 
Zamora, Jorge. Elementos de lo grotesco en algunas narraciones de Francisco Ayala 









Name:   Sandra P. Preciado 
 
Post-secondary  Western University 
Education and  London, Canada 
Degrees:   2014-2016 Masters 
 




Honours and  Merit Based Scholarship of Faculty of Philosophy and Literature 
of the Universidad de Guanajuato. 
Awards:   2007 
 
Related Work  Teaching Assistant 




Preciado, Sandra. “Desencuentros” in Diez veces. Letras Versales, 20. Altexto. 
Universidad de Guanajuato. Guanajuato, México. 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
